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FOREIGN POLITICAL INTERFERENCE IN THE 
GOVERNANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES: A 
MARKET AND BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 
CHRISTOPHER CHEN* & LAUREN YU-HSIN LIN** 
This Article examines how regulators and a company’s stakeholders 
can and should respond to external political interference from a foreign 
government. This Article argues that the interactions created by different 
stakeholders influence the market’s response to such interference. This 
Article uses the “Party building” political movement in China to illustrate 
how Chinese businesses listed in Hong Kong reacted to interference from 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Party building is the CCP’s 
attempt to strengthen its control of listed companies by: having CCP 
organization’s in a company (organizational interference), controlling 
management decisions (management interference), and controlling human 
resources (human resources interference). The political campaign offers a 
rare chance to observe how corporate stakeholders respond to external 
political interference from another country. This Article shows that fewer 
than a third of the companies examined were early adopters of Party 
building provisions. This suggests that managers have not been willing to 
accept political interference, especially when their companies are registered 
outside of China. However, companies that have adopted “Party building” 
provisions in their corporate charters have generally accepted some 
organizational interference or managerial interference. Still, they have been 
less accommodating to more direct control over personnel or human 
resources decisions. Consequently, this Article argues that securities 
regulators, in an open market, should adopt a market-driven approach to 
counter foreign political interference that empowers shareholders by 
increasing transparency, instead of implementing drastic interventions, such 
as mandatory delisting. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines how securities regulators should respond to the 
political influence exercised by a foreign government on companies listed 
on its domestic securities exchange. Should a securities regulator rely on 
market power to curb foreign political interference? Alternatively, should a 
host regulator adopt stringent measures to combat foreign powers? The 
efficiency of either approach depends on the reactions of corporate 
stakeholders. The importance of an appropriate response to foreign political 
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interference is accentuated by reports of foreign interference in elections1 
and China’s rise as a political and economic power.2 
There is little doubt that political pressure, from domestic or foreign 
actors, can affect listed companies when a stock market is international and 
has many foreign listed entities, such as the New York Stock Exchange.3 
Political influence by a foreign government (“foreign political interference” 
or external political interference) raises two key questions: (1) whether 
foreign political influence on the corporate governance of a locally listed 
company hurts the targeted firms’ value or the overall market; and (2) how 
the host market regulator should deal with such interference. For 
clarification, the term “host market regulator” refers to the securities 
regulator of the stock exchange where a foreign company is listed. For 
example, for Chinese companies listed for trading in Hong Kong: the home 
market would be in Mainland China and consequently, the home government 
would be the Chinese government. Conversely, the Hong Kong stock market 
is the host market and Hong Kong’s regulators (such as the Hong Kong 
Securities and Futures Commission and the Hong Kong Exchange) are the 
host regulators. 
This Article posits that political interference into the governance of a 
company should be deterred. This Article generally refers to ‘political 
interference’ as an exercise of power by political actors to influence a 
corporate decision. Political interference can take many forms: from political 
connections or appointees, to ordering a company to comply with a demand.4 
 
 1.  For example, there were allegations that Russia interfered with the U.S. presidential election in 
2016. See, e.g., 2016 Presidential Election Investigation Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 27, 2020, 1:25 PM), 
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/12/us/2016-presidential-election-investigation-fast-facts/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/8DV4-25KL]; 2016 Presidential Campaign Hacking Fast Facts, CNN (Oct. 28, 2020, 
3:12 PM), https://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/26/us/2016-presidential-campaign-hacking-fast-facts/index. 
html [https://perma.cc/5FCM-L6KQ]. There is also concern that China meddled with Taiwan’s 
presidential election in January 2020. See, e.g., Sheridan Prasso & Samson Ellis, China’s Information 
War on Taiwan Ramps Up as Election Nears, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 23, 2019, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-23/china-s-information-war-on-taiwan-ramps-up-
as-election-nears [https://perma.cc/8DTR-GUDS]. 
 2.  For example, the Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) on a purchasing power parity basis 
amounted to less than 5% of global GDP in the 1980s but it has amounted to over 15% of global GDP 
since 2012 and has surpassed the share of GDP of the United States in relation to global GDP. See Wayne 
M. Morrison, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33534, CHINA’S ECONOMIC RISE: HISTORY, TRENDS, 
CHALLENGES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 11 fig.7 (2019). 
 3.  Based on the information provided by the New York Stock Exchange, there are 507 non-U.S. 
issuers listed for trading in the New York market as of April 30, 2020. See Current List of All Non-U.S. 
Issuers, N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/data/ 
CurListofallStocks.pdf [https://perma.cc/62KX-NGMX]. 
 4.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
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Although political connections may benefit a company,5 political 
interference generally depresses a company’s value.6 
Interference depresses a company’s value by exacerbating the costs 
associated with the principal-agent problem. In general, a relationship 
between the principal (i.e., the company)  and its agents (i.e., the managers) 
implies some information asymmetry and moral hazard. For example, 
managers may use company resources’ for their personal benefit.7 To 
counter this, the principal (i.e., the company) incurs monitoring costs to 
reduce the risk of misconduct.8 Management’s wrongful conduct could also 
create losses.9 Those costs, or losses, are commonly referred to as “agency 
costs,” which hurt the company’s value.10 When foreign powers interfere in 
a company’s corporate governance, managers may be pressured to make 
decisions that benefit politicians, rather than the company and its 
shareholders. If so, it could result in losses to the company (e.g. the company 
providing services at a lower price to the politician) and thereby increasing 
the agency costs. 
Political interference also increases the risk of corruption or 
wrongdoing, such as “tunneling” or disadvantageous related-party 
transactions.11 For example, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) experience 
some degree of political intervention due to state ownership. The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) noted 
that SOEs might suffer from “undue hands-on and politically motivated 
ownership interference, leading to unclear lines of responsibility, a lack of 
accountability and efficiency losses in the corporate operations.”12  To 
illustrate, the Chinese government ordered state-owned banks to extend 
credit to rescue its’ economy during the global financial crisis.13 Without the 
 
 5.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 6.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 7.  See generally Stephen A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem, 63 
AM. ECON. ASS’N 134 (1973) (discussing issues related to agency, such as moral hazard and information 
asymmetry). 
 8.  Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  “Tunneling” generally refers to “the transfer of resources out of a company to its controlling 
shareholder (who is typically also a top manager).” Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 
22, 22 (2000). 
 12.  OECD, GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 12 (2015 
ed. 2015) [hereinafter GUIDELINES ON STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES]. 
 13.  Giant Reality-Check, ECONOMIST: FIN. & ECON. (Aug. 31, 2013) [hereinafter Giant Reality-
Check], http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21584331-four-worlds-biggest-lend 
ers-must-face-some-nasty-truths-giant-reality-check [https://perma.cc/7425-G463]. 
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order, bank managers would have been less likely to extend credit to a 
borrower if it meant higher risk of default after the financial crisis.14 Whether 
SOEs operate efficiently and whether they should be wholly or partially 
privatized is beyond this Article’s scope. However, even when an SOE is 
partially state-owned, concerns that political interference might affect the 
overall market and other non-state shareholders remain. Because of the 
agency costs to the company and stakeholders, political interference should 
be avoided. 
The strategies that securities regulators adopt to manage political 
interference depends on various factors. A regulator is part of its’ domestic 
government and, consequently, subject to politics. For example, an 
independent financial regulator, such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in the United States, “provide[s] greater confidence and trust 
that regulatory decisions are made with integrity.”15 An independent 
regulator is more likely to maintain competitive neutrality when government 
and non-governmental entities are regulated under the same framework.16 
Independence and impartiality are crucial when regulatory conduct has a 
significant impact on the industry.17 However, the independence, and 
consequently effectiveness, of a regulator depends on its domestic 
government’s institutional integrity. 
In the case of foreign interference, how securities regulators (“host 
regulators”) respond also depends on the relationship between the 
government of the company’s home country and the government hosting the 
stock exchange (“host market”). There are also difficulties with enforcing 
rules against breaches of directors’ duties or inappropriate disclosures by a 
foreign company. For example, host regulators may not be able to serve 
notice, secure evidence, or freeze assets when a company primarily operates 
in another jurisdiction.18 The lengths to which a securities regulator must go 
to address foreign political interference also depends on how domestic 
corporate stakeholders react to foreign political influence. 
 
 14.  There was a debt bubble occurring in China after the 2008 global financial crisis. Why China’s 
Debt Defaults Are More Alarming This Time, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2020, 11:18 AM) [hereinafter 
China’s Debt Defaults], https://www.bloombergquint.com/quicktakes/why-china-s-debt-defaults-are-
more-alarming-this-time-quicktake [https://perma.cc/5RTU-PE86]. 
 15.  OECD, THE GOVERNANCE OF REGULATORS: BEING AN INDEPENDENT REGULATOR 34 (2016). 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  See, e.g., Wai Yee Wan et al., Public and Private Enforcement of Corporate and Securities 
Laws: An Empirical Comparison of Hong Kong and Singapore, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 319, 334–35 
(2019) (suggesting the difficulty of gathering evidence against directors, particularly in foreign listings, 
as a possible explanation for the rarity of private enforcement actions brought against directors in Hong 
Kong and Singapore). 
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This Article explores how corporate stakeholders, namely managers 
and current and prospective shareholders,19 react to foreign political 
interference. Their response to foreign political interference informs a 
securities regulator’s approach. This Article also examines responses that a 
host regulator may adopt when facing political interference by a foreign 
government or political entity. Potential regulatory responses include: no 
action; moderate measures, such as insisting on disclosure and transparency; 
or stringent measures, like delisting or prohibitions from listing. As 
previously suggested, each approach must be evaluated within the context of 
a given market. 
This Article examines responses to external political interference 
through the CCP’s “Party building” (or dangjian) political movement, an 
intrusion into the governance of Chinese companies listed on a foreign stock 
exchange.20 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP or the Party) already had 
some presence in some Chinese companies before the recent Party building 
movement. By the end of 2016, approximately 67.8% of the 2.73 million 
private enterprises in China had a Party organization representing the CCP 
(e.g. committee comprising of CCP members) in the companies.21 The CCP 
attempted to further strengthen its role in the governance of SOEs through 
Party building.22 In October 2016, President Xi Jinping made a speech re-
affirming the CCP’s leadership of SOEs,23 stressing that Party organizations 
 
 19.  See generally MASAHIKO AOKI, CORPORATIONS IN EVOLVING DIVERSITY: COGNITION, 
GOVERNANCE, AND INSTITUTIONS 20 (2010) (discussing the separation of control and management in a 
corporate structure); MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT 21 (2006) (discussing how ownership, management, and 
employment fit together in a firm). 
 20.  Zhonggong Zhongyang Bangong Ting (中共中央办公厅) [General Office of the Chinese 
Communist Party Central Committee], Guanyu Zai Shenhua Guoyou Qiye Gaige Zhong Jianchi Dang de 
Lingdao Jiaqiang Dang de Jianshe de Ruogan Yijian (关于在深化国有企业改革中坚持党的领导加强
党的建设的若干意见) [The Opinions on Upholding Party Leadership and Strengthening Party Building 
in Deepening the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises], ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHONGYANG 
RENMIN ZHENGFU (中华人民共和国中央人民政府) [THE CENTRAL PEOPLE’S GOVERNMENT OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (Sept. 20, 2015, 6:15 PM), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-
09/20/content_2935593.htm [https://perma.cc/785G-XRZX]. 
 21.  Xianchu Zhang, Integration of CCP Leadership with Corporate Governance: Leading Role or 
Dismemberment?, 1 CHINA PERSP. 55, 60 (2019). 
 22.  Id. For more details on the meaning of Party building in addition to having party organizations 
in the company, see infra Part III.A. 
 23.  Xi Jinping Zongshuji Dui Guoqi Dangjian Gongzuo Ti Le Naxie Xin Yaoqiu (習近平總書記對
國企黨建工作提了哪些新要求) [New Requirements Raised by General Secretary Xi Jinping Regarding 
State-Owned Enterprises’ Party Building Works], ZHONGGUO GONGCHANDANG XINWEN WANG (中国
共产党新闻网） [CPC NEWS] (Oct. 12, 2016, 10:52 AM) [hereinafter New Requirements Raised by 
General Secretary Xi Jinping], http://dangjian.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2016/1012/c117092-
28772532.html [https://perma.cc/BW2P-P3SU]. 
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must be incorporated into a company’s governance framework.24 He also 
emphasized the importance of the CCP’s leadership for SOE managers, and 
the Party’s goals as an important objective of the company.25 It was a sign 
that the Chinese government was “unwilling to relinquish too much control 
over China’s state companies.”26 
However, the CCP did not confine Party building to SOEs. The 
campaign extends to private enterprises, joint ventures between SOEs and 
foreign companies,27 and foreign enterprises in China.28 The latest 
amendment to the Code of Corporate Governance, issued by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), required all listed companies to 
implement CCP organization and provide resources for the Party 
organization.29 Listed companies must also include Party provisions in their 
corporate constitution.30 This increases the risk that the CCP could influence 
privately held and even foreign companies. This also impedes foreign 
regulators, also known as host market regulators, from curbing the growing 
influence of the CCP over cross-listed Chinese businesses.31 
This Article examines how companies listed on the Hong Kong 
Exchange (HKEx), with assets, earnings, or significant activities in 
Mainland China (“Chinese businesses”), responded to President Xi Jinping’s 
 
 24.  Id. A Party organization is an organization or committee comprised of members of CCP in the 
company. SCOTT LIVINGSTON, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., THE NEW CHALLENGE OF 
COMMUNIST CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2–3, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/ 
publication/210114_Livingston_New_Challenge.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ25-MAAA] (last visited Mar. 
25, 2021). A Party organization follows instructions from leaders of the CCP. Id. 
 25.  New Requirements Raised by General Secretary Xi Jinping, supra note 23. 
 26.  Emily Feng, Xi Jinping Reminds China’s State Companies of Who’s the Boss, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/14/world/asia/china-soe-state-owned-enterprises.html 
[https://perma.cc/9UHF-ATEP]. 
 27.  Lucy Hornby, Communist Party Asserts Control over China Inc, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/29ee1750-a42a-11e7-9e4f-7f5e6a7c98a2 [https://perma.cc/8J29-3S2J]. 
 28.  Alexandra Stevenson, China’s Communists Rewrite the Rules for Foreign Businesses, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/business/china-communist-party-foreign-
businesses.html [https://perma.cc/3B6T-SBQJ]. 
 29.  Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze (上市公司治理准则) [Code of Corporate Governance for 
Listed Companies in China] (promulgated by China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n & State Econ. & Trade 
Comm’n, Jan. 7, 2002, revised Sept. 2018), art. 5, [hereinafter China Corporate Governance Code], 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/zjhpublic/zjh/201809/P020180930584077967335.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4BH-
LNLK]. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Shirley Yam, Opinion, Regulators’ Silence on Communist Party Presence in Listed State 
Companies Is Deafening, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 20, 2018, 2:54 PM), https://www.scmp.com/ 
business/article/1993277/regulators-silence-communist-party-presence-listed-state-companies [https:// 
perma.cc/76FB-J5AA]; Jennifer Hughes, China’s Communist Party Writes Itself into Company Law, FIN. 
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/a4b28218-80db-11e7-94e2-c5b903247afd 
[https://perma.cc/967P-SAT3]. 
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Party building campaign. Although Chinese businesses operate 
predominantly in China, they can be incorporated in Mainland China or an 
offshore jurisdiction, like Bermuda.32 After examining corporate 
stakeholders reactions, the Article then explores how host regulators (e.g., 
Hong Kong) respond to political interference by foreign governments (e.g., 
China). Although Hong Kong is strictly-speaking not a foreign market in 
relation to the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong offers a useful 
perspective as an international financial center with many Chinese 
businesses’ listings.33 
Part II analyzes several types of political interference and the general 
impact of foreign actors’ political interference on a company’s governance. 
Part II then considers how corporate stakeholders and securities regulators 
can respond to political interference. Shifting to focus on China, Part III 
examines the Party building movement and its effect upon businesses listed 
on the Hong Kong Exchange, measured by the amendments to corporate 
constitutions. Following the findings presented in Part III, Part IV explores 
regulatory strategies to combat foreign political interference. Part V 
concludes by suggesting that regulators should rely on transparency and 
market forces to contain foreign political interference. 
II. OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL INTERFERENCE, MARKET 
REACTIONS AND CONTAINMENT STRATEGIES 
This Part provides an overview of foreign political actors interfering 
with corporate governance and its effects on stakeholders and firm value. 
Utilizing a behavioral perspective, it analyzes the potential responses of 
companies and stakeholders to political interference and how companies can 
manage such pressure. Finally, this Part examines regulatory responses to 
address political interference, including improving transparency and 
disclosure, controlling foreign listings through listing requirements, and 
changing corporate hierarchies. 
A. The Ramifications on Corporate Governance and Firm Value 
This Section briefly introduces ways that government actors interfere 
with a company, such as state ownership, political connections, regulatory 
interventions, and mandating a political institution’s creation, like China’s 
 
 32.  See infra Part III.B.1. 
 33.  Pursuant to the Hong Kong Exchange, there were 1,241 companies (out of a total of 2,449 listed 
in the exchange) that were considered to be Mainland enterprises at the end of 2019. HKEX, HKEX FACT 
BOOK 2019 1 (2019), https://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media/HKEX-Market/Market-Data/Statistics/Consol 
idated-Reports/HKEX-Fact-Book/HKEX-Fact-Book-2019/FB_2019.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/G35F-
PLPV]. 
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Party building requirement. This Section then examines the effects on the 
governance and value of listed companies. 
1. Types of Political Interference 
Political interference takes many forms. A company may interact with 
government agencies, politicians, and companies owned by or linked to the 
state while conducting business. Those interactions open the door for 
government actors to interfere with the governance of a company. For 
example, a politician can pressure a company to hire his son when there are 
other better candidates for the same position.34 Although external forces 
impose pressure, a company may also invite political interference. This 
Article refers to invited interference as “internal political interference,” and 
uninvited interference as “external political interference.” Although this 
Article focuses on uninvited interference, specifically by a foreign 
government, some internal political interference aspects are also explored in 
this Section. 
a. Political Interference Through Equity Ownership 
One common form of political interfence is through ownership of 
equity stakes in a domestic company by the state.35 For instance, existing 
empirical studies show that compliance with Party building reforms36 was 
positively correlated with state ownership in China.37 
The OECD defines an SOE as “any corporate entity recognized by 
national law as an enterprise, and in which the state exercises ownership.”38 
In short, a corporate entity qualifies as an SOE if a state government 
exercises effective control of the management of the company.39 
Furthermore, different levels of government—such as local, state, and 
federal—may control a state enterprise. In China, SOEs may be controlled 
by central, provincial, or local governments, creating different SOEs layers. 
Sometimes, an SOE is a subsidiary of another state-owned company. For 
example, the China Resources Group, a state-owned conglomerate, has 
 
 34.  Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Politicians and Firms, 109 Q.J. ECON. 995, 1002 (1994) 
[hereinafter Politicians and Firms]. 
 35.  OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: A SURVEY OF OECD 
COUNTRIES 20–21 (2005). 
 36.  See infra Part III.A. 
 37.  See John Zhuang Liu & Angela Huyue Zhang, Ownership and Political Control: Evidence from 
Charter Amendments, INT’L REV. L. & ECON., July 31, 2019, at 1, 2; Lauren Yu-Hsin Lin & Curtis J. 
Milhaupt, Party Building or Noisy Signaling? The Contours of Political Conformity in Chinese Corporate 
Governance 21 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 493/2020, 2020), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3510342 [https://perma.cc/RMW3-NG4S]. 
 38.  GUIDELINES ON STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES, supra note 12, at 14. 
 39.  Id. at 14–15. 
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multiple subsidiaries in China and Hong Kong, such as China Resources 
Land and China Resources Power, which are also SOE’s.40 
In addition to a state agency itself owning equity in the company, the 
state may also indirectly control an SOE through public or quasi-public 
entities. For example, the majority of shares in the Tsinghua Unigroup, a 
producer of semiconductors, are owned by Tsinghua Holdings. Tsinghua 
Holdings is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Tsinghua University, which in 
turn is subject to the control of China’s Ministry of Education.41 
The state can also establish a stake in a company through a sovereign 
wealth fund. A sovereign wealth fund could be generally defined as a state-
owned investment fund or entity that is commonly established from balance 
of payments surpluses, foreign exchange reserves, fiscal surpluses or 
government transfer payments, etc.42 For instance, the Singaporean 
government centralizes its control over certain companies, generally labeled 
“government-linked companies,”43 through a wholly-owned sovereign 
wealth fund called Temasek Holdings.44 Alternatively, some countries allow 
state operators to effectively control a company even if the state holds a 
minority interest.45 
 
 40.  See, e.g., Governance, CHINA RES., http://en.crc.com.cn/investors/governance/ [https://perma 
.cc/DM9X-DSUT] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021). 
 41.  Announcement from Qi Lian, Chairman, Sun East Technology (Holdings) Limited, Grant of 
Waiver from Strict Compliance with the Minimum Public Float Requirement (Sept. 2, 2016) (on file with 
SINO ICT Holdings Limited) (“Tsinghua Holdings is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Tsinghua University, 
which is a tertiary education institution directly under the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic 
of China.”). 
 42.  See What is a Sovereign Wealth Fund?, SWFI, https://www.swfinstitute.org/research/  
sovereign-wealth-fund [https://perma.cc/H556-H9WJ] (last visited Dec. 25, 2020). 
 43.  Christopher Chen, Solving the Puzzle of Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: 
The Path of the Temasek Model in Singapore and Lessons for China, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 303, 312, 
317–19 (2016). 
 44.  See id. at 312–14 (describing the creation of Temasek Holdings, an investment company model, 
and noting that although Temasek owned and managed its own investments after having received initial 
support from the government, it now only controls twelve of the initial thirty-five companies that 
comprised its portofolio); Yvonne C.L. Lee, The Governance of Contemporary Sovereign Wealth Funds, 
6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 197, 229–30 (2010) (comparing Government of Singapore Investment Corp and 
Temasek). For more historical perspectives, see generally Tan Cheng-Han et al., State-Owned Enterprises 
in Singapore: Historical Insights into a Potential Model for Reform, 28 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 61 (2015) 
(analyzing the foundation of Singapore’s successful government-linked companies and to what extent 
this model can be applied to China’s reformation of its state-owned enterprises). 
 45.  For example, the Ministry of Finance owned only 12.19% of shares in Changhua Bank, one of 
the oldest commercial banks in Taiwan, as of April 2020. See Major Shareholders, CHANG HWA BANK 
[hereinafter Major Shareholders], https://www.bankchb.com/frontend/mashup_eng.jsp?funcId=35ebfbf 
315 [https://perma.cc/X6GB-GPJ3] (last visited Aug. 21, 2020). However, four directors (out of nine) on 
the board of the bank are nominees of the government. See Members of the Board of Directors, CHANG 
HWA BANK, https://www.bankchb.com/frontend/mashup_eng.jsp?funcId=9b9b580615 [https://perma 
.cc/J9X4-DH7P] (last visited Aug. 21, 2020). Both the chairman and the chief executive officer are 
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Although SOEs are commonly subject to political interference, the 
degree of interference vary across countries. For example, Singapore’s 
government has exercised substantial self-restraint by not interfering with 
the management of government-linked companies.46 In contrast, the Chinese 
government has shown more willingness to interfere with corporate 
decisions, such as instructing state-owned banks to extend credit to 
distressed companies during the global financial crisis in 2008.47 Reports 
also emerged that, in 2015, the Chinese government asked state-owned 
banks to lend money to traders to prop up the stock market.48 Furthermore, 
fourteen of the twenty-five companies listed on China’s new Science and 
Technology Innovation Board (“STAR” board) under the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange have “state-owned investors among their top three shareholders,” 
and state-owned wealth funds dominate trading activity.49 This indicates a 
high possibility that the Chinese government used state ownership to 
influence a company’s decision to list on the new STAR board (instead of 
other stock markets) or bought the shares of these companies for policy 
reasons, including propping up the new stock market. Moreover, a state’s 
willingness to control a company may also depend on the industry. In 
Taiwan, utility companies—e.g., electricity and water suppliers—remain 
firmly controlled by the government, whereas SOEs in other industries—
e.g., banking—have been privatized since the late 1980s.50 
b. Political Interference through Other Means 
Political interference may also manifest through political connections, 
regulatory authority or simply political power held by a politician or political 
party. If a government or a politician has an appointee in a company’s board 
or management—e.g. as a nominee director or a well-known politician’s 
son—the government or politician can influence a company’s governance 
 
nominees of the Ministry of Finance which also appointed the Director General of National Treasury 
Administration onto the board as a non-executive director. Id. In essence, the Ministry of Finance has 
effective control over the management of bank, despite holding only 12.19% of shares. Major 
Shareholders, supra note 45. 
 46.  Chen, supra note 43, at 365. 
 47.  See Giant Reality-Check, supra note 13. 
 48.  Gabriel Wildau, China’s Biggest State Banks Recruited into Stock Market Rescue, FIN. TIMES 
(July 17, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/c30b6f3a-2c3d-11e5-8613-e7aedbb7bdb7 [https://perma.cc/ 
7ECV-RZXP]. 
 49.  Tom Hancock & Wang Xueqiao, State-Owned Investors Dominate China’s New Tech 
Exchange, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/87dd12b2-ba85-11e9-8a88-
aa6628ac896c [https://perma.cc/Y8A4-WUGU]. 
 50.  Huei-Wen Pao et al., The Road to Liberalization: Policy Design and Implementation of 
Taiwan’s Privatization, 5 INT’L ECON. & ECON. POL’Y 323, 334–36 (2008). 
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and decisions. Nevertheless, the extent of influence depends on the 
relationship between politically connected persons and the company. 
Political interference can be exercised through regulations, especially 
highly regulated industries.51 A bank might need approval to appoint a chief 
executive officer. A politician who wants to influence the bank may instruct 
a relevant regulator to delay approval until the bank complies with political 
demands. Similar interference could occur if a business requires a license or 
permit—e.g., a construction permit to develop a site. This power is apparent 
in highly regulated industries, such as banks or telecommunication firms, 
where companies frequently interact with regulators. 
In addition, companies are subject to overt political interference by a 
politician or a political party due to the politician or political party’s 
dominant power in a country. For example, as elaborated below, China’s 
Party building movement has attempted to formalize the CCP’s presence 
within companies.52 The CCP has thereby written itself into companies’ 
governance structure,53 even where the Party lacks an equity stake. 
2. The Pros and Cons of Political Interference on Companies 
Political interference can benefit companies. However, interference, 
whether invited or not, can harm a company and its value. This Section first 
considers invited political interference, through the lens of political 
connections, and then examines costs of other forms of external political 
interference. 
Political connections offer both economic and noneconomic benefits to 
a company. For example, political connections can increase the likelihood of 
acquiring government contracts or favorable loans from state-owned 
banks.54  Companies may also have better access to international sources of 
funds.55 Well-connected companies are more likely to be bailed out when 
international institutions, like the World Bank, provide financial assistance 
to a national government.56 In China, politically connected banks are more 
likely to lend to politically connected companies, which are, in turn, more 
 
 51.  See Politicians and Firms, supra note 34, at 1015. 
 52.  Before the political movement, some companies already had CCP organizations, but their 
presence was not officially recognized in the companies’ constitutions. See infra Part III.A. 
 53.  Hughes, supra note 31. 
 54.  Agyenim Boateng et al., Politically Connected Boards, Ownership Structure and Credit Risk: 
Evidence from Chinese Commercial Banks, 47 RSCH. INT’L BUS. & FIN. 162, 164–65 (2019). 
 55.  See Shujun Ding et al., Political Connections and Agency Conflicts: The Roles of Owner and 
Manager Political Influence on Executive Compensation, 45 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 407, 408 
(2015). 
 56.  Mara Faccio et al., Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts, 61 J. FIN. 2597, 2597, 2617 
(2006). 
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likely to be bailed out in an economic crisis.57 Notably, politically connected 
executives receive more compensation from non-state-owned companies 
than from state-owned companies.58 The difference suggests that non-state-
owned companies offer more rewards for political connections.59 
In addition to benefits to the company, the state may benefit from 
political connections. The Chinese government has a strong interest in 
Alibaba, an e-commerce giant, because government agencies use its 
platforms to conduct billions of dollars of transactions.60 A politically-
connected appointee may restrain management’s conduct by acting as 
unofficial government oversight. External oversight may force managers “to 
cut wages and bonuses when enterprise performance is poor.”61 The benefits 
of political connections are not limited to less developed or more corrupt 
countries. Political connections provide corporate rent-seeking even in a 
low-corruption environment.62 Although political connections can be 
useful,63 quantifying the value of such connections may be challenging.64 
Despite the benefits brought by political connections, even invited 
interference can harm a company. A politically connected chief executive 
officer is found to be more likely to implement strategic initiatives and credit 
policies that favor the government than a less connected officer. 
Implementing those initiatives or policies would in turn increase the risk of 
default for Chinese banks.65  Comparing forty-seven countries, companies 
with political connections were found to possess higher leverage, more 
substantial market power, but performed worse than non-connected 
 
 57.  Chi-Hsiou D. Hung et al., Bank Political Connections and Performance in China, 32 J. FIN. 
STABILITY 57, 57, 67 (2017). 
 58.  Ding et al., supra note 55, at 407, 429–30. 
 59.  See id. 
 60.  Jay Somaney, Chinese Government Has a Huge “Stake” in Alibaba, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2015, 
6:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jaysomaney/2015/10/18/chinese-government-has-a-huge-
stake-in-alibaba/?sh=23bf93a125b8 [https://perma.cc/8SJT-88PN]. Alibaba’s platforms include the likes 
of Taobao and Tmall. Id. 
 61.  Eric C. Chang & Sonia M.L. Wong, Political Control and Performance in China’s Listed 
Firms, 32 J. COMP. ECON. 617, 620 (2004). 
 62.  Mario Daniele Amore & Morten Bennedsen, The Value of Local Political Connections in a 
Low-Corruption Environment, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 387, 387, 401 (2013). 
 63.  Raymond Fisman, Estimating the Value of Political Connections, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1095, 
1095–96 (2001). 
 64.  See id. at 1095 (“The claim was that in Southeast Asia, political connectedness, rather than 
fundamentals such as productivity, was the primary determinant of profitability and that this had led to 
distorted investment decisions. . . . However investigations in this area have not progressed beyond the 
level of case study and anecdote. That is, there has been no attempt to estimate the degree to which firms 
rely on connections for their profitability.”). 
 65.  Boateng et al., supra note 54, at 171. 
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companies.66 The difference in financial performance between politically 
connected and non-connected companies depend on a country’s economic 
development and corruption.67 For instance, “[c]ountries that are richer, 
more democratic, and have free press have more disclosure [by 
politicians].”68 It was also found that “[p]ublic disclosure . . . is positively 
related to government quality, including lower corruption.”69 
Other than the benefits that political connection offers companies, it is 
widely argued that political interference generally harms companies’ value. 
First, political interference in a company’s governance increases agency 
costs.70 It is taken for granted that those who exercise political interference 
reap some personal benefits, such as patronage hiring or procuring goods.71 
Government officials may pursue their political objectives at the expense of 
company shareholders.72 To illustrate, if managers’ incentives come from 
their political interests, rather than their business acumen, they may promote 
their careers at the expense of the company. This reflects the common 
perception that SOEs are improperly managed and less efficient than their 
private counterparts.73 In many countries, state-owned banks increase their 
lending in election years.74 In some cases, political interference could be a 
form of corruption. In China, political interference by local Party committees 
was associated with negative firm performance, and such a negative impact 
on firm value outweighs any reduction in managerial agency costs, e.g., by 
restraining largest shareholders from expropriation.75 
Second, issues of accountability arise when government actors interfere 
with a company’s governance while lacking any legal obligations to its 
 
 66.  Mara Faccio, Differences Between Politically Connected and Nonconnected Firms: A Cross-
Country Analysis, 39 FIN. MGMT. 905, 906 (2010). 
 67.  Id. at 905. 
 68.  Simeon Djankov et al., Disclosure by Politicians, 2 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 179, 179 
(2010). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  See generally Ross, supra note 7 (presenting a short summary of the economic theory of agency 
and a discussion of the factors that influence agent behavior, such as fee schedules and the distribution of 
information between the principal and the agent); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8 (offering a fuller 
discussion of the economic theory of agent behavior by listing the types of agency costs and how the 
principal’s use of monitoring and incentives can affect such costs). 
 71.  Politicians and Firms, supra note 34, at 995–96. 
 72.  Joseph P. H. Fan et al., Institutions and Organizational Structure: The Case of State-Owned 
Corporate Pyramids, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1217, 1221–22 (2012). 
 73.  OECD, PRIVATISING STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: AN OVERVIEW OF POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES IN OECD COUNTRIES 20 (2003). 
 74.  I. Serdar Dinç, Politicians and Banks: Political Influences on Government-Owned Banks in 
Emerging Markets, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 453, 453, 475–76 (2005). 
 75.  Chang & Wong, supra note 61, at 617. 
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shareholders. In many common law countries76 and China77, directors and 
some senior management, owe a fiduciary duty to the company. When a 
political actor is not a director or lacks an official role within the company, 
they also lack any legal responsibility for their conduct—e.g., a poor 
management decision—even if it results in loss. 
Third, divergent views between stakeholders and external actors may 
lead to a conflict of interest.78 As mentioned earlier, the Chinese government 
requested that state-owned banks extend credit to SOEs during the global 
financial crisis.  The interference over the bank’s decisions was for the state’s 
interests—i.e., to prop up the economy—but not necessarily aligned with the 
banks’ or their shareholders’ interests because higher non-performing loans 
might hurt the bank’s value.79 In this situation, there is a conflict of interests 
between the state’s interests and the interests of the company. Minority 
investors are likely to suffer when the government actor enjoys power 
disproportionate to its interests in the company.80  In addition, there could be 
an inherent conflict of interest from the state’s dual role as a shareholder and 
regulator.81 On the one hand, state’s exercise of regulatory power—e.g. 
applying fines for pollution—increases costs and reduces profits of an SOE; 
on the other, if the state decides not to exercise regulatory power because it 
might hurt the value of the state’s equity stakes in a company,it could be 
detrimental to the society, e.g., for environmental protection. 
Even the state owner can tunnel at the expense of shareholders. Through 
political pressure, the state can induce a company to serve their objectives.82 
These actions may be done in the name of some public interest, like reducing 
unemployment or managing labor relations. However, such gains are usually 
at the expense of the company—e.g., hiring unsuitable or unnecessary 
 
 76.  See Percival v. Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421, 425 (UK) (explaining that directors are trustees of the 
company and must act in the company’s best interests when disposing of its shares). 
 77.  See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (中华人民共和国公司法) [Company Law of 
the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 
2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), arts. 147, 148, http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=4685 
&lib=law [https://perma.cc/5UWE-TGYX]. 
 78.  Zhang, supra note 21, at 59–60. 
 79.  See Giant Reality-Check, supra note 13. 
 80.  Zhang, supra note 21, at 59; Lauren Yu-Hsin Lin, Institutionalizing Political Influence in 
Business: Managerial Resistance and Insider Control, 45 VT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript 
at 1) (on file with author). 
 81.  Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2917, 
2919 (2012). 
 82.  This has been described as a “grabbing hand,” a term coined by Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. 
Vishny. See generally ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. VISHNY, THE GRABBING HAND: GOVERNMENT 
PATHOLOGIES AND THEIR CURES (1998) (using “grabbing hand” as a term to describe the imposition of 
predatory policies, such as arbitrary taxes, by public sector institutions). 
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employees—and could, therefore, damage the company’s value.83 The 
problem may be heightened if an SOE is wholly or partially privatized but 
remains heavily regulated.84 In this situation, the company has private 
investors but continues to be exposed to the same degree of political 
interference. Arguably, SOEs’ related-party transactions (i.e. transactions 
with connected persons of the company) may decrease social welfare when 
the state attempts to prop up SOEs with benefits that are otherwise 
unavailable to private enterprises.85 
In addition, political interference could result in poor management and 
financial performance. A study found that having more political connections 
hampered an SOE’s globalization efforts.86 In Taiwan, companies with 
robust corporate governance focused less on building political connections, 
and politically connected companies were likely to demonstrate poor 
corporate governance.87 Similarly, politically connected financial 
institutions in the United States have higher leverage levels and greater 
volatility that exposes financial institutions to higher financial risk than their 
non-politically connected counterparts.88 
In sum, companies can benefit from their political connections. 
However, external political interference can harm corporate governance and 
reduce a company’s value. Understanding the costs and benefits of political 
interference, the following sections analyze stakeholders’ reactions to 
external political interference. It then explores possible responses for 
securities regulators or stock market operators. 
B. A Behavioral Analysis of Reactions to External Political Interference 
Managers’ and stakeholders’ responses determine the effectiveness of 
external interference and inform how host market regulators curb such 
interference. This Section explores the possible reactions of corporate 
 
 83.  See generally Yingyi Qian, Enterprise Reform in China: Agency Problems and Political 
Control, 4 ECON. TRANSITION 427 (1996) (discussing how the allocation of control rights between 
managers and the government leads to political and agency costs for SOEs). 
 84.  Politicians and Firms, supra note 34, at 1015. 
 85.  Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mariana Pargendler, RPTs in SOEs: Tunneling, Propping, and Policy 
Channeling 2 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 386/2018, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3119164 [https://perma.cc/9DAV-WX9D]. 
 86.  Hao Liang et al., An Anatomy of State Control in the Globalization of State-Owned Enterprises, 
46 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 223, 223 (2015). 
 87.  Chung-Hua Shen et al., Do Strong Corporate Governance Firms Still Require Political 
Connection, and Vice Versa?, 39 INT’L REV. ECON. & FIN. 107, 118 (2015). 
 88.  See generally Leonard Kostovetsky, Political Capital and Moral Hazard, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 
144, 144 (2015) (“[P]rior to the 2008 financial crisis, politically-connected financial firms had higher 
leverage and were more likely to increase their leverage . . . . which was associated with worse 
performance . . .”). 
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stakeholders including managers, current shareholders, and prospective 
investors. This Article posits that corporate stakeholders should object to 
external political interference unless they can gain personally from such 
interference. If they provide sufficient opposition, the effect of political 
interference could be avoided or compromised to some extent. Corporate 
stakeholders’ responses and their effectiveness in curbing political 
interference then determine how regulators should respond to foreign 
political interference. 
First, companies’ managers generally resist political interference by 
external actors unless a manager has political connections. Irrespective of 
whether a company is a private enterprise or SOE, interference affects 
managerial discretion. Restrictions on managerial discretion could affect the 
company’s performance and value. For example, Chinese companies “tend 
to perform better when managers have flexibility in labor deployment.”89 
Hence, managers should prefer more flexibility in managerial discretion and 
reduce the influence of politicians. 
Moreover, even managers of SOEs are expected to resist external 
political interference. In addition to reduced managerial discretion, external 
political interference provides additional oversight90 that managers may not 
like. Without additional oversight, managers of an SOE would enjoy 
significant discretion over state assets and benefit from on-the-job 
consumption and perks.91 Consequently, even the managers of an SOE have 
incentives to resist political interference. 
However, the effectiveness of SOE managers’ resistance to political 
interference depends on the control exerted by a government. The stronger 
the control, the more likely an SOE is subject to direct political interference. 
In contrast, if a company is more remote from the source of political 
influence, this might lessen the power of political interference, and managers 
are more likely to object to it.  For example, an SOE’s management is subject 
to more direct political pressure if the government is a controlling 
shareholder. In contrast, a company’s lower position in the corporate 
pyramid indicates a higher chance of resisting or being immune from 
political interference from external political interference through the state 
 
 89.  Lixin Colin Xu et al., Politician Control, Agency Problems and Ownership Reform: Evidence 
from China, in THE REVIVAL OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN CHINA 199, 216 (Shuanglin Lin & Shunfeng 
Song eds., 2007). 
 90.  For example, one example of extra oversight by a political entity is the CCP’s imposition of a 
disciplinary committee on the company. See infra Part III.A. 
 91.  Yingyi Qian, Reforming Corporate Governance and Finance in China, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES: INSIDER CONTROL AND THE ROLE OF BANKS 215, 222 
(Masahiko Aoki & Hyung-Ki Kim eds., 1995). 
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owner.92 The reason is that the instructions of an ultimate state owner (i.e., 
the controlling shareholder of the parent SOE) are not necessarily enforced 
down a corporate pyramid structure. Therefore, an SOE experiences less 
pressure when the company is a subsidiary, or even a subsidiary of a 
subsidiary, of another state-owned company, resulting in higher managerial 
discretion. In other words, SOEs in which the managers enjoy greater 
autonomy are more likely to resist harmful political interference if managers 
think it hurts the company.93 
Managers’ responses to external political interference also differ 
depending on the source of influence. For example, suppose the controlling 
owner of an SOE is the Ministry of Finance. In that case, the company is 
more likely to respond more forcibly to political interference by the finance 
minister or the prime minister than to interference exercised by a local city 
councilor in the rural area. Similarly, SOE managers closer to Beijing are 
more likely to follow instructions from the CCP’s leaders or by the central 
government, given their vicinity in terms of connection to the center of 
political power and geographical distance. Thus, it is reasonable to expect 
that SOEs in which the managers enjoy greater autonomy are more likely to 
resist political interference.94 
Second, the divergence of interests among shareholders also 
complicates a company’s response to political interference. Non-state 
shareholders generally object to political interference because it reduces the 
company’s value and, hence, their investment’s value.95 However, non-state 
shareholders may not object when interference benefits them individually or 
the company. For shareholders who are the state or government agency, their 
responses depend on the owner’s nature and the political environment. 
Third, prospective investors, similar to minority shareholders, are more 
likely to object to external political interference. For investors in the equity 
market, a collective adverse reaction could result in either a downward price 
movement in the stock market or undervaluation of a companies’ share 
prices. A company’s financing costs might increase when issuing new shares 
or bonds. If the share price becomes too low, it increases the likelihood of a 
prospective investor’s takeover. The possibility of competition for corporate 
control may constrain management’s willingness to accept external political 
interference.96 Therefore, if the possibility of a hostile takeover is real, 
 
 92.  Fan et al., supra note 72, at 1221. 
 93.  Lin, supra note 80, at 35. Lin, supra note 80, at 35. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  See supra Part II.A. 
 96.  See generally Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. 
ECON. 110 (1965) (demonstrating an active market for control of corporations by examining various 
CC. FOREIGN INTERFERENCE MACROS VER. 2(DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2021  10:16 PM 
2021] INTERFERENCE IN THE GOVERNANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES 319 
managers are less likely to accept external political interference that may hurt 
the company’s value. 
The diversity of views held by corporate stakeholders create dynamic 
interactions. Their interests shape how a company, as a whole, responds to 
political interference. This Article argues that shareholders, prospective 
investors, and corporate management are more likely to resist external 
political interference unless they have something to gain. Their responses 
impact the effectiveness of political interference. If together, corporate 
stakeholders provide strong enough resistance, external political interference 
should not be effective, and its negative impact on firm value could be 
avoided or reduced.  If this is the case, the market can provide the power to 
deter or curtail the effect of external political interference. 
C. Response Strategies by Securities Regulators 
This Section examines response strategies that securities regulators 
might adopt when listed companies in the stock market face foreign political 
interference. This Section first illustrates challenges to securities regulators 
if political interference comes from domestic sources and examines the 
difficulties of dealing with foreign political interference after a company’s 
listing. This Section then presents three possible options: strengthening 
market power through transparency, greater control through listing 
requirements, and forcing companies to change corporate structures. In the 
end, this Article argues that strengthening market power through a higher 
degree of transparency to help corporate stakeholders to resist foreign 
political interference is the better approach. 
When interference comes from domestic sources, securities regulators’ 
responses will depend on the domestic government’s politics, institutional 
structure, and power balance. A regulator’s ability to issue regulations, for 
example, might do little to inhibit interference. For instance, when the CCP 
issued instructions to incorporate Party building into corporate constitutions, 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) followed up by adding 
them into the code of corporate governance. 97 Given the CCP’s dominance,98 
the CSRC could not address the Chinese government’s political interference. 
 
antitrust and economic implications of competition and mergers on shareholders and management); David 
Scharfstein, The Disciplinary Role of Takeovers, 55 REV. ECON. STUD. 185 (1988) (analyzing how 
takeover threats, when used as a means of creating capital market competition, play a role in disciplining 
management). 
 97.  China Corporate Governance Code, supra note 29. 
 98. China Anniversary: How the Communist Party Runs the Country, BBC (Sept. 30, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49631120 [https://perma.cc/82QX-8DTJ]; Christina Zhou, 
China’s Communist Party is at a Fatal Age for One-Party Regimes. How Much Longer Can It Survive?, 
ABC NEWS (Jan. 5, 2020, 7:18 PM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-01-05/chinas-communist-party-
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Securities regulators face a different kind of challenge with foreign 
political interference. First, the response of a securities regulator depends to 
some extent on the relationship between the countries where the regulator is 
and where political interference originates. For example, regulators in a 
larger market, like the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United 
States, have more power to deal with foreign political interference than 
regulators in smaller markets like Singapore or regulators in a subordinated 
jurisdiction like Hong Kong. Second, market conditions affect responses to 
foreign political interference. Larger stock exchanges with a deeper pool of 
listed companies like the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the 
NASDAQ may be more likely than their smaller peers to impose listing or 
conduct requirements based on undesirable political interference. As the 
largest stock exchanges in the world, according to market capitalization,99 
the NYSE and NASDAQ have more ability to either filter companies who 
want to list or force compliance with their requests. Companies may not want 
to endanger their successful initial public offerings (IPOs) or secondary 
listings in the U.S. capital market for financial, reputational, or other 
concerns. Consequently, the market restrains political interference, at least 
seemingly. 
Market conditions can also adversely affect how regulators perceive 
foreign political interference, especially in a smaller country.  For example, 
neither Singapore nor Hong Kong possesses the political leverage to bargain 
with the Chinese government. Hong Kong is administered as a special 
administrative region under the PRC.100 Although politically distinct and 
farther away, Singapore is a smaller country that relies on trade and financial 
 
is-at-a-fatal-age-for-one-party-regimes/11807138 [https://perma.cc/GX5V-AYMD]; Ming Xia, The 
Communist Party of China and the “Party-State,” N.Y. TIMES, https://archive.nytimes.com/ 
www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-politics-002.html [https://perma.cc/CVQ2-8EE9] (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2021). 
 99.  See, e.g., Becca Cattlin, What are the Largest Stock Exchanges in the World?, IG (Mar. 12, 
2019, 11:01 AM) https://www.ig.com/au/trading-strategies/what-are-the-largest-stock-exchanges-in-the-
world—180905 [https://perma.cc/WE8Z-VLTD]; Rolando Y. Wee, Biggest Stock Exchanges in the 
World, WORLD ATLAS (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/biggest-stock-exchanges-in-
the-world.html [https://perma.cc/D6PP-2FMY]. 
 100.  See The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. CHINA, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ljzg_665465/zgjk_665467/3572_665469/t17814.shtml [https://perm 
a.cc/Z98H-6UL9] (last visited Feb. 26, 2021). Since Great Britain handed over Hong Kong to the People’s 
Republic of China in 1997, Hong Kong has been treated as a “special administrative region” in China, 
enjoying some degree of autonomy based on Hong Kong’s Basic Law, including using its own laws and 
courts. Id. However, Hong Kong is not an independent country. See id. Some international organizations 
list Hong Kong as “Hong Kong, China.” See id. (explaining that Hong Kong may join the World Trade 
Organization, other international organizations and international trade agreements under the name “Hong 
Kong, China”). 
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services with Chinese businesses to support its economy.101  Due to heavy 
competition for listings, Hong Kong and Singapore governments are likely 
to welcome Chinese companies, despite the political interference associated 
with Chinese companies. With the rise of Chinese technology giants like 
Alibaba and Tencent, both Singapore and Hong Kong have allowed the 
listing of companies with dual-class shares102 to attract more high-rise 
Chinese companies.103 
Before a company is listed on a stock exchange, regulators can prevent 
political interference ex ante by rejecting the company’s listing if there are 
concerns over foreign political interference. For example, the Holding 
Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA) requires that foreign issuers, 
who retain a non-inspected, registered public accounting firm in a foreign 
jurisdiction, establish that they are not owned or controlled by a foreign 
government.104 If the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB)105 cannot inspect a foreign public accounting firm for three 
consecutive years, the foreign issuer will be banned from listing their shares 
on U.S. securities exchanges.106 
 
 101.  Per the Singapore government’s statistics for 2017, finance and insurance services accounted 
for 13.3% of Singapore’s gross domestic product, while wholesale and retail trade accounted for 17.6% 
of the gross domestic product. SING. DEP’T OF STATISTICS, SINGAPORE IN FIGURES 2018, at 9 (2018), 
https://www.singstat.gov.sg/-/media/files/publications/reference/sif2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EQU-W 
DPF]. 
 102.  In a typical dual-class shares structure, a company’s equity is divided into multiple classes of 
shares with one class entitling holders to multiple voting rights and another class sold to public investors 
with one vote per share. Holders of the former class are usually the company’s founders and executives. 
Aurelio Gurrea-Martínez, Theory, Evidence, and Policy on Dual-Class Shares: A Country-Specific 
Response to a Global Debate 5 (Ibero-Am. Inst. for Law & Fin., Working Paper 3/2019, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3397880 [https://perma.cc/9N5N-H93Z]. There are academic debates as 
to whether the dual-class shares structure hurts firm value and corporate governance. See generally Mara 
Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 
365, 384–93 (2002) (explaining how dual-class shares can be a control enhancing mechanism that creates 
significant disparities between the control and ownership of a firm); Ting Li & Nataliya Zaiats, Corporate 
Governance and Firm Value at Dual Class Firms, 36 REV. FIN. ECON. 47, 67–68 (2018) (finding that 
dual-class firms are more likely to employ increased shareholder rights provisions and those rights are 
often not significantly associated with firm value). 
 103.  Hong Kong and Singapore Succumb to the Lure of Dual-Class Shares, ECONOMIST (Mar. 1, 
2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/03/01/hong-kong-and-singapore-succ 
umb-to-the-lure-of-dual-class-shares [https://perma.cc/39EN-HJCX]. 
 104.  Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act § 2, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7214(i)(2) (Westlaw through 
Pub. L. No. 116-222). 
 105.  Created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the PCAOB was a non-profit corporation 
established by the Congress of the United States to oversee the audit of public companies in order to 
protect investors and public interests. About, PUB. COMPANY ACCT. OVERSIGHT BD., 
https://pcaobus.org/About/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q2UJ-PXGP] (last visited Feb. 26, 
2021). 
 106.  15 U.S.C. § 7214(i)(3). The Trump administration issued a set of recommendations in July 
2020 to implement the bill and give existing issuers a transition period until January 1, 2022. Soyoung 
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However, a regulator’s options are limited when a company has already 
been listed. This Article specifically considers three options to deal with 
interference: bolstering transparency requirements to assist corporate 
stakeholders to respond to foreign political interference, imposing more 
stringent listing standards to force companies out of the market, or 
prescribing a company to change its corporate structure to immunize it from 
external political interference. This Article discusses each in turn. 
1. Strengthening Corporate Stakeholders through Transparency 
Securities regulators could bolster available information by 
strengthening disclosure requirements regarding foreign political 
interference. By requiring disclosure of material information or notices to 
shareholders, informed stakeholders can better respond to the nature and 
scope of political interference. In other words, this is a relatively non-
intrusive approach. By providing relevant information public, the market 
price can reflect the information and the extent of political interference. It 
then can generate market forces to restrain a company’s responses to foreign 
political interference. 
Disclosure empowers the market to correct for political interference. If 
a company’s share price falls, the market sends a signal to other market 
participants to self-correct. A lower valuation of the company’s shares could 
incentivize managers to resist interference to reduce further devaluation. If 
the market’s response sufficiently damages the company, the management 
and shareholders might resist the interference. If this is the case, the costs of 
interference could be contained. Alternatively, a lower valuation might invite 
market participants to acquire a larger stake in the company or compete for 
control. Corporate managers would thus be incentivized to avoid political 
interference to reduce the chance of a potential takeover by another person 
or entity unless they are political appointees. Regulators can create an 
environment, through disclosure requirements, where the market effectively 
corrects for potential interference. 
However, there are also limitations to the effectiveness of disclosure 
and the market’s power. First, there has been considerable debate on the 
market’s ability to absorb information.107 Information regarding alleged 
interference may be unclear. For example, disclosure requirements may not 
reach informal conversations, such as state officials requesting that managers 
 
Ho, Trump Administration Seeks to Delist U.S.-Listed Chinese Companies for Blocking Audit Inspections, 
THOMSON REUTERS (Aug. 10, 2020), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/news/trump-administration-seeks-
to-delist-u-s-listed-chinese-companies-for-blocking-audit-inspections [https://perma.cc/TH2H-JJ5L]. 
 107.  See generally EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, THE MECHANICS AND REGULATION OF MARKET ABUSE: 
A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 45–56 (2005) (discussing the history and criticism of the 
assumptions underlying the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis and the Capital Asset Pricing Model). 
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of a state-owned bank maintain credit lines. Likewise, notice may be given 
regarding the appointment of a new chairman, but the reason for the 
appointment may be excluded. This limits the effectiveness of disclosure 
requirements and, consequently, the market’s ability to respond to political 
interference adequately. 
Second, the market for corporate control might not exist, so that the 
chance of being taken over by a third party is low. Some countries may deter 
takeovers for policy reasons, like bolstering “national champions” or 
protecting local industries.108 The degree of concentrated ownership and the 
nature of the controlling owner would also impact the takeover market’s 
effectiveness.109 Also, assuming that such a market exists, it is still 
questionable whether it effectively reduces agency problems.110 In many 
countries, hostile takeovers are virtually non-existent. Moreover, the market 
for corporate control of an SOE is less likely if the state is unwilling to sell 
their positions. These entrenched positions could prevent any takeover of an 
SOE by an outsider, although that SOE might bid to take over other 
companies.111 In this situation, market pressures may be inadequate to 
control external political interference. 
2. Greater Control Through Listing Requirements 
Securities regulators can directly address foreign political interference 
through listing requirements. Once a company is already listed, addressing 
foreign political interference through warnings, suspensions, or delisting 
may not be effective or could detrimentally affect shareholders’ interests.112 
Host market regulators have little power to enforce rules against a foreign 
government. For example, the Securities Exchange Commission is unlikely 
to acquire a court order to stop the CCP from setting up Party organizations 
when that company’s headquarters and assets are in China. 
Furthermore, although suspending trading or delisting could remove 
foreign interference from the market, they are draconian measures that could 
adversely affect the overall market. Minority shareholders will suffer if they 
 
 108.  Paul Davies et al., Control Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 205, 240 (3d ed. 2017). 
 109.  See id. 
 110.  See Charlie Weir, The Market for Corporate Control, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 328, 338–39 (Mike Wright et al. eds., 2013) (arguing that the predominance 
of non-hostile takeovers raises questions about whether the market for corporate control is an effective 
mechanism for disciplining corporations). 
 111.  See, e.g., Chiara D. Del Bo et al., Governments in the Market for Corporate Control: Evidence 
from M&A Deals Involving State-Owned Enterprises, 45 J. COMP. ECON. 89, 90 (2017). 
 112.  For example, under U.S. law, the Securities and Exchange Commission has the power to 
suspend the trading of a security if, in the Commission’s opinion, the suspension is in the public interest 
and necessary to protect investors. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(k). 
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cannot cash out their shareholdings after a trading suspension or mandatory 
delisting due to an event (i.e., political interference) beyond their control. 
Securities regulators would also have to weigh draconian measures against 
the costs of losing listings in stock exchanges if companies that are exposed 
to foreign political interference decide to avoid the U.S. market and list 
elsewhere. 
3. Changing Corporate Structure to Immunize the Company 
Securities regulators could require changes in corporate structures to 
place a company in the lower level of a corporate pyramid to shield 
companies from political pressure. A study found that intervening layers of 
corporate hierarchies empowered managers by distancing them from direct 
political pressure, and the Chinese government built corporate pyramids (i.e., 
a corporate group with layers of holding companies and subsidiaries in its 
vertical structure) to insulate managers from political interference, despite 
the risk of increased agency costs.113 Hence, to ensure that managers are 
more empowered to resist political interference, it is arguable that a company 
should be allowed to be listed if it is in the lower part of a corporate pyramid. 
However, this approach is also counter-intuitive. On the one hand, securities 
regulators generally prefer transparency and accountability in the corporate 
structure. Being in the lower level of a corporate pyramid hardly improves 
transparency. On the other hand, a complicated corporate structure may also 
interfere with effective monitoring over the management’s conduct. 
Therefore, this Article does not prefer this approach. 
4. Summary 
Securities regulators must decide which approach most efficiently 
counters foreign political interference. In an open market with powerful 
institutional investors, promoting transparency and disclosure could 
efficiently curb foreign political interference. Greater transparency can 
empower managers, shareholders, and prospective investors to decide what 
is best for the company in light of foreign political interference. In other 
words, this Article proposes a market-driven approach to deal with foreign 
political interference. The approach is preferred to suspension or mandatory 
delisting, as the latter hurts shareholders’ interests. However, the market-
driven approach’s effectiveness depends on whether corporate stakeholders 
could respond to foreign political interference, as the Article predicts. The 
next Part explores how Chinese businesses listed in Hong Kong responded 
to the CCP’s Party building movement. 
 
 113.  Fan et al., supra note 72, at 1219. 
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III. PARTY BUILDING IN HONG KONG 
This Part explores political interference by a foreign actor through the 
CCP’s Party Building requirement in China. Section A examines three kinds 
of Party building provisions: organizational, management, and human 
resources. Section B uses the rate of adoption as a measure of compliance 
with external political interference. Overall, their response demonstrates 
compliance with political interference, illustrated by the requirements 
imposed from the CCP of relevant Party building provisions. Section C then 
examines Hong Kong’s reaction to that political interference by observing 
share prices. Section D summarizes the findings present. 
A. Understanding Party Building 
The CCP is writing itself into the country’s largest companies’ 
corporate constitutions, which this Article refers to as the “Party building” 
movement. In January 2017, the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) of the State Council and the CCP 
Central Organization Department jointly issued an official notice asking 
SOEs to incorporate Party building provisions into their corporate 
constitutions, including their sample provisions.114  The Party building 
movement then extends from SOEs to private enterprises.115 In short, 
Chinese companies must formalize the CCP’s role in the company by 
recognizing the CCP’s party organization and power in their corporate 
constitutions. “While the new language makes explicit investors’ long-held 
assumption of party influence, the changes are the first time the party rather 
than the government has been named, investors said.”116 
This Article classifies Party building provisions into three categories: 
(1) general provisions establishing the CCP’s role in the company 
(“organizational interference”); (2) provisions that give the CCP a role in 
management decisions (“management interference”); and (3) provisions that 
grant the CCP control over management or human resources personnel 
 
 114.  Guanyu Zhashi Tuidong Guoyou Qiye Dangjian Gongzuo Yaoqiu Xieru Gongsi Zhangcheng 
de Tongzhi (关于扎实推动国有企业党建工作要求写入公司章程的通知) [Notice Regarding the 
Promotion of the Requirements of Incorporation of Party Building Work into the Articles of Associations 
of State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated by the Org. Dep’t of the Cent. Comm. of the Chinese 
Communist Party & the State-Owned Assets Supervision & Admin. Comm’n of the State Council, Mar. 
15, 2017, effective Mar. 16, 2017), Zu Tong Zi (组通字) [2017] No. 11, [hereinafter Requirements of 
Incorporation of Party Building Work], https://jzb.zju.edu.cn/_upload/article/files/38/38/dbe8ec 
03469692297d7dcc27ec95/7158a359-54f9-4543-a7f4-fdcab818d633.pdf [https://perma.cc/2829-6U9Z] 
(China). 
 115.  See Hornby, supra note 27. 
 116.  Hughes, supra note 31. 
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(“human resources interference”).117 This Section elaborates on each 
category in more detail below. 
First, organizational interference requires a company’s constitution to 
formally introduce the CCP’s Party organization as an organ of the company. 
Before Party building, a company might informally have a Party 
organization inside the company.118 However, the CCP’s Party building 
campaign requires a company to formalize its existence in its constitution. 
There could be several forms of organizational interference. A company’s 
constitution can state that it will follow the “Constitution of the Communist 
Party of China.”119 More importantly, a company’s constitution must 
expressly create a Party organization, or Party committee, as a company 
organ alongside the board of directors and shareholders.120 The Party 
committee is expected to exercise “the core leadership role, providing 
direction, managing the overall situation and ensuring implementation [of 
CCP’s policies].”121 Through those provisions, the CCP establishes itself 
inside a company to lead the company and ensure that it will follow the 
CCP’s instructions. In addition to creating the Party committee, a company 
 
 117.  We use the phrase “management interference” in the same way Liu and Zhang use the phrase 
“decision-making control;” and use “human resources interference” in the same way Liu and Zhang use 
“personnel control.” Liu & Zhang, supra note 37, at 8. 
 118.  Zhang, supra note 21, at 56. 
 119.  E.g., Zhongguo Guoji Hangkong Gufen Youxian Gongsi Zhangcheng (中国国际航空股份有
限公司章程) [Articles of Incorporation of Air China Limited], Air China, art. 11 (Oct. 19, 2018), 
http://www.airchina.com.cn/cn/images/investor_relations/%E5%9B%BD%E8%88%AA%E8%82%A1
%E4%BB%BD%E5%85%AC%E5%8F%B8%E7%AB%A0%E7%A8%8B(2018.10.19%E4%BF%AE
%E8%AE%A2%E7%89%88).pdf [https://perma.cc/R9Y6-N3ED], translated in Articles of Association 
of Air China Limited, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Air China (2018)], https://markets.ft.com/ 
data/announce/full?dockey=1323-13836412-0UEHL36DSUMC7N01048PBFPN16 [https://perma.cc/ 
XYK4-BRXJ]; Zhongguo Tiejian Gufen Youxian Gongsi Zhangcheng (中国铁建股份有限公司章程) 
[Articles of Incorporation of China Railway Construction Corporation Limited], China Ry. Constr. Corp., 
art. 1 (June 11, 2018), http://www.crcc.cn/module/download/downfile.jsp?classid=0&filename=2b527 
9493c084a87b6a744b716b61ac0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QVE-JBM5], translated in Articles of 
Association of China Railway Construction Corporation Limited, HKEX [hereinafter China Railway 
Construction Corp. (2018)], https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2019/1218/2019121 
801017.pdf [https://perma.cc/8K7U-GG8T] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021); Zhongguo Gongshang Yinhang 
Gufen Youxian Gongsi Zhangcheng (中国工商银行股份有限公司章程) [Articles of Incorporation of 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China], Indus. & Commercial Bank of China, art. 13 (Sept. 25, 2017), 
http://v.icbc.com.cn/userfiles/Resources/ICBCLTD/download/2017/gszc_cn.pdf [https://perma.cc/AN5 
H-33A9], translated in Articles of Association of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited, 
ICBC [hereinafter ICBC (2017)], http://v.icbc.com.cn/userfiles/Resources/ICBCLTD/download/2017/ 
gszc_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7FK-TTBF] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021). 
 120.  E.g., Air China (2018), supra note 119, art. 11; China Railway Construction Corp. (2018), 
supra note 119, art. 247; ICBC (2017), supra note 119, art. 13. 
 121.  ICBC (2017), supra note 119, art. 13. See also Air China (2018), supra note 119, art. 11 (“The 
Party committee shall perform the core leading and political functions, control the directions, manage the 
situation and ensure the implementation.”). 
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is also obligated to provide “sufficient personnel to handle Party affairs 
and . . . sufficient funds to operate.”122 In short, the CCP can use the 
company’s resources to sponsor its Party organization. 
The CCP can also strengthen its grip on a company’s organizational 
structure through a disciplinary inspection committee.123 The CCP 
disciplinary inspection committee serves as the CCP’s anti-corruption 
enforcement agency and Party rules.124 A company manager could be subject 
to the Party’s investigation or penalties for violation of Party disciplines. 
Therefore, the presence of a disciplinary inspection committee greatly 
enhances the CCP’s power to interfere with a company’s governance 
through the Party’s disciplinary actions. Additionally, the appointment of a 
full-time deputy secretary allows the CCP to maintain a constant presence 
within the company to, for example, monitor management. Deputy-
secretaries are also responsible for the implementation of CCP policies and 
instructions within the company.125 Thus, the presence of a full-time deputy 
secretary should enhance the CCP’s grip on a company. 
Second, provisions regarding management interference require that 
managerial decisions comply with CCP policies. By interfering with 
management decisions, it reduces the management’s discretion in governing 
the company. For example, one common provision requires that the “board 
of directors shall make inquiries with the Party committee before making 
decisions on major issues of the Company.”126 In another example, a 
company’s constitution that “the President shall hear the opinion of the Party 
Committee of the Company before he hosts the office meeting to discuss and 
decide on material issues in relation to the production, operation and 
management of the Company.”127 By requiring the board of directors or 
managers to solicit the Party organization’s opinions before making a 
material decision, the CCP interferes with the company’s management 
decisions. Such interference could reduce a company’s value if the CCP’s 
interests are not aligned with its overall interest.  If management and Party 
 
 122.  Air China (2018), supra note 119, art. 11. See also ICBC (2017), supra note 119, art. 13 (“The 
working organs of the Party shall be established, equipped with sufficient staff to deal with Party affairs 
and provided with sufficient funds to operate the Party organization.”). 
 123.  E.g., ICBC (2017), supra note 119, arts. 52–53. 
 124.  Guo Yong, The Evolvement of the Chinese Communist Party Discipline Inspection Commission 
in the Reform Era, 12 CHINA REV. 1, 2 (2012). 
 125.  E.g., Air China (2018), supra note 119, art. 106; ICBC (2017), supra note 119, art. 52. 
 126.  Air China (2018), supra note 119, art. 113. See also China Railway Construction Corp. (2018), 
supra note 119, art. 166 (“The Board shall hear the opinions of the Party Committee of the Company 
before making decisions on material issues of the Company.”); ICBC (2017), supra note 119, art. 144 
(“The opinions of the Party Committee shall be heard before the board of directors decides on material 
issues of the Bank.”). 
 127.  China Railway Construction Corp. (2018), supra note 119, art. 202. 
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officials disagree on a matter, presumably, the management should follow 
the CCP’s instruction, even if it is not for the company’s best interests (e.g., 
lending money to an SOE to prop up the latter’s finance). Otherwise, a 
manager is exposed to the risk that he might be subject to the CCP’s 
disciplinary actions or other penalties by the CCP (e.g., no promotion in the 
future). Thus, it may affect how managers make decisions for the company’s 
best interests if they know the CCP monitors them. 
Finally, the CCP can also interfere with human resources decisions. In 
addition to having Party organization and requiring the management to 
consult the CCP before a management decision, another way to insert the 
CCP’s role in a company is by requiring most senior managers to be Party 
members or serving in the Party organizations. The CCP could also interfere 
with the promotion of a company’s managers or employees and ensure that 
they follow the CCP’s policies and instructions.  For example, the 
constitution of the International and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), one 
of the largest banks in the world,128 specifies as follows: 
Eligible members of the Party Committee can join the board of directors, 
the board of supervisors and the senior management through legal 
procedures, while eligible members of the board of directors, the board of 
supervisors and the senior management can also join the Party Committee 
in accordance with relevant rules and procedures.129 
Based on this provision, a person can only be appointed as a director if the 
person is considered eligible by the CCP, and people likely must be loyal to 
the Party to be considered eligible. In addition, the chairman of the board 
and Party secretary of the Party committee can be the same person.130 
Although such a measure would undoubtedly help enforce the CCP rules 
inside a company, it is disputed whether such a person could uphold their 
fiduciary duty of loyalty.131 
 
 128.  The ICBC is one of the global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) designated by the 
Financial Stability Board, alongside the likes of Bank of America and Goldman Sachs, etc. See FIN. 
STABILITY BD., 2019 LIST OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS (G-SIBS), Annex (2019). 
 129.  ICBC (2017), supra note 119, art. 52. See also Air China (2018), supra note 119, art. 106 
(“Eligible members of the Party committee are entitled to be admitted to the board of directors, the 
supervisory committee, and the management through legal procedures, and eligible Party members from 
the board of directors, the supervisory committee, and the management are entitled to be admitted to the 
Party committee in accordance with relevant rules and procedures.”); China Railway Construction Corp. 
(2018), supra note 119, art. 247 (“Eligible members in the Board, Supervisory Committee and 
management may join the Party Committee in accordance with relevant requirements and procedures.”). 
 130.  E.g., Air China (2018), supra note 119, art. 106; China Railway Construction Corp. (2018), 
supra note 119, art. 247; ICBC (2017), supra note 119, art. 52. 
 131.  Zhang, supra note 21, at 60. 
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Additionally, the Party committee may be responsible for developing 
the CCP’s cadres132 and supervising the process of appointing management 
personnel. Below is an example of how the Party committee is instructed to 
act: 
[t]o adhere to the principle of the Party exercising leadership over cadres, 
the selection of management by the board of directors, and the exercise of 
power as regards the right of cadres’ appointment by the management in 
accordance with laws. The Party committee shall deliberate and give 
opinions on the candidates nominated by the board of directors or the 
general manager, or recommend nominees to the board of directors or the 
general manager. The Party committee of the Company, together with the 
board of directors, shall observe the proposed candidates and give 
opinions collectively.133 
This provision allows the CCP to control human resources decisions on the 
appointment of personnel. By controlling the appointment and promotion of 
personnel, the CCP can strengthen its control of a company directly by, for 
example, having a person that the CCP favors to be in a company’s higher 
position. 
In summary, the Party building movement aims to strengthen the CCP’s 
control over listed companies and entrench its role as a core element of 
corporate governance. The political campaign is a product of the “legal and 
ideological struggle in an uncertain course charted by CCP policies” since 
the 1970s between the market economy and political authoritarianism.134  It 
also underlines the conflict between China’s stated policy of following the 
corporate governance principles and the desire to strengthen CCP’s role in a 
listed company.135 Eventually, the “integration of the Party leadership with 
corporate governance may further complicate the already overloaded legal 
framework and its rational function,”136 increasing the “challenges and 
difficulties to the accountability and enforcement of corporate 
governance.”137 
 
 132.  In general, a cadre “refers to a public official holding a responsible or managerial position, 
usually full time, in party and government.” Marcia R. Ristaino, Party and Government, in CHINA: A 
COUNTRY STUDY 407, 434 (Robert L. Worden et al. eds., 4th ed. 1988). The CCP’s cadre system serves 
as an important regime function for the CCP to control human resources and managerial positions within 
the Party and the Chinese government, on all levels. 
 133.  Air China (2018), supra note 119, art. 107(2); see also China Railway Construction Corp. 
(2018), supra note 119, art. 248(ii) (“The Party Committee of the Company shall . . . adhere to the 
principle of the Party exercising leadership over the cadres, the principle of the legitimate selection of 
operators by the Board, and the exercise of power as regards the right of cadres’ appointment by the 
operators in accordance with law.”). 
 134.  Zhang, supra note 21, at 57. 
 135.  Id. at 55–56, 59. 
 136.  Id. at 60. 
 137.  Id. 
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In sum, Party building provisions open the doors to CCP interference to 
varying degrees. Of the three kinds of provisions, one introduces the CCP 
into a company through a Party organization (i.e., the organizational 
interference). The second grants the Party organization the ex ante power to 
review major company decisions (i.e., “management interference”). The 
third allows the CCP to control the appointment of the company’s board of 
directors or managers (i.e., human resources interference). Party building is 
meant to have a substantial impact on Chinese businesses, whether they are 
SOEs or not. 
B. Adopting Party Building Provisions 
1. Chinese Businesses Listed in Hong Kong 
This Part examines how Chinese businesses on the Hong Kong 
Exchange (HKEx) responded to the CCP mandate to incorporate Party 
building provisions. HKEx classifies Chinese businesses into two categories: 
H-share companies and red-chip companies.138 Hong Kong defines H-share 
companies as those “incorporated in Mainland China and whose listings in 
Hong Kong are approved by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC).”139 In contrast, “red chip companies are enterprises that are 
incorporated outside of the Mainland and are controlled by Mainland 
government entities.”140 Although registered outside China, a red-chip 
company usually derives more than 55% of its revenue or assets from 
China.141 This means that a red-chip company’s major business operations 
and revenue come from the Mainland. As of 2018, 104 H-share companies 
(those incorporated in mainland China) were cross-listed on the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, making their shares available for trading in 
domestic and foreign markets. In contrast, no red-chip company (those 
incorporated outside mainland China) is cross-listed on a Chinese stock 
exchange. 
 
 138.  China Dimension, HKEX [hereinafter China Dimension], https://www.hkex.com.hk/Market-
Data/Statistics/Consolidated-Reports/China-Dimension?sc_lang=en [https://perma.cc/2C2T-68X7#sel 
ect1=0&select2=0] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) (use the second drop down menu under the words “CHINA 
DIMENSION” to navigate between “List of H Share Companies” and “List of Red Chip Companies” 
lists). 
 139.  Overview of the Listed Market, HKEX [hereinafter Overview of the Listed Market], 
https://www.hkex.com.hk/Global/Exchange/FAQ/Getting-Started/Overview-of-the-listed-market?sc_la 
ng=en [https://perma.cc/2E2W-Z5UT] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) (click on the words “In what ways are 
H-share companies different from red chips? How can investors obtain the lists of the companies?”); see 
also FTSE RUSSELL, GUIDE TO CHINESE SHARE CLASSES: V.1.5, at 3 (2019). 
 140.  Overview of the Listed Market, supra note 139. 
 141.  FTSE RUSSELL, supra note 139. 
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In order to list on a foreign stock exchange, Chinese companies often 
adopt the “variable interest entity” (VIE) corporate structure. Sina’s initial 
public offering, which runs a popular web portal in China, popularized the 
VIE structure among Chinese businesses who wanted to carry out their initial 
public offerings and list on a foreign stock exchange.142 As a VIE, business 
operations are still conducted by the domestic Chinese company (Company 
X) in China, but the entity listed in a foreign stock exchange is a company 
incorporated in a foreign country (Company Y). The foreign incorporated 
entity (Company Y) does not directly own the domestic business (Company 
X) and vice versa. Instead, Company Y’s control over Company X is 
established through a complex web of contracts.143 Company X’s profits or 
losses are eventually reflected in Company Y’s account. Despite the inherent 
risks associated with the opaque structure,144 it helps evade Chinese laws that 
restrain foreign capital in Chinese companies and circumvents controls over 
foreign direct investment.145 This might explain the popularity of the VIE 
structure among Chinese companies who use foreign-incorporated entities 
for their initial public offerings. Over 92 percent of Chinese companies listed 
on the NASDAQ use the VIE structure.146 The VIE structure also means that 
Company Y is only listed in a foreign stock exchange and not cross-listed in 
a Chinese stock exchange. 
Chinese companies often list on the HKEx, given Hong Kong’s 
proximity to China’s southern shore. Hong Kong’s status as an international 
financial center helps Chinese companies “raise capital in a freely 
convertible currency . . . for their business development”, enjoy greater 
liquidity, and a better regulatory environment.147  Listing on HKEx also 
boost investors’ confidence because of Hong Kong Securities and Futures 
Commission corporate governance requirements that are on par with 
 
 142.  Mengwei Ma, The Perils and Prospects of China’s Variable Interest Entities: Unraveling the 
Murky Rules and the Institutional Challenges Posed, 43 H.K.L.J. 1061, 1061–62 (2013); Yu-Hsin Lin & 
Thomas Mehaffy, Open Sesame: The Myth of Alibaba’s Extreme Corporate Governance and Control, 10 
BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 437, 444–46 (2016). 
 143.  Ma, supra note 142, at 1063. 
 144.  Id. at 1067–71. 
 145.  Samuel Farrell Ziegler, Note, China’s Variable Interest Entity Problem: How Americans Have 
Illegally Invested Billions in China and How to Fix It, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 539, 541, 547–48 (2016); 
Ma, supra note 142, at 1064–65. 
 146.  Coco Liu, Chinese Offshore IPOs Grow More Reliant on Shaky Legal Structure, NIKKEI ASIA 
(Oct. 8, 2018, 9:55 AM), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/Chinese-offshore-IPOs-grow-more-
reliant-on-shaky-legal-structure/ [https://perma.cc/9EWU-GP5M]. 
 147.  HKEX, FACT SHEET ON THE LISTING OF H-SHARES 3 (2013), https://www.hkex.com.hk/-
/media/hkex-market/news/news-release/2013/130806news/fact-sheet_20th-h-shares [https://perma.cc/4 
CNW-MUU7]. 
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international standards.148 Among twelve markets, the Asian Corporate 
Governance Association ranked Hong Kong second, and China tenth on 
corporate governance.149 To deal with the listing of Chinese businesses, the 
HKEx has a dedicated chapter in its listing rules that govern companies 
incorporated in China.150 
By the end of 2018, 423 Chinese businesses listed in Hong Kong151 on 
both the main board and the growth enterprise market (GEM) board.152 
Regardless of whether they are H-share or red-chips, most Chinese 
businesses listed in Hong Kong are SOE. Based on the Wind database153, 
299 (70.69%) of the 423 companies were SOEs. The central government 
controlled 172 of the SOEs (“central SOEs”) whereas provincial or local 
governments controlled 127 (“local SOEs”). Less than 30 percent (29.31%) 
of companies were private enterprises.154 
Of the 423, 260 were H-share and 163 were red-chips155 (presented in 







 148.  Id. at 3–4. 
 149.  ASIAN CORP. GOVERNANCE ASS’N & CLSA LTD., CG WATCH 2018: HARD DECISIONS: ASIA 
FACES TOUGH CHOICES IN CG REFORM 16 (2018), https://www.acga-asia.org/files.php?aid=362 
&id=1196 [https://perma.cc/8NKS-2DS6]. 
 150.  See HKEX, LISTING RULES, ch. 19A, https://en-rules.hkex.com.hk/sites/default/files/net_file 
_store/HKEX4476_3208_VER40.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GPM-DDPB] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021). 
 151.  The data is calculated based on the date of listing provided by the HKEx. China Dimension, 
supra note 138. The figure does not include one company, Sinotrans Shipping Ltd. (stock code: 368), 
which was delisted in October 2018. Id. 
 152.  The Mainboard is the major market place for established listed companies in Hong Kong. In 
contrast, the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) board is a “market with lower listing eligibility criteria . . . 
compared to the Main Board, serving the needs of small and mid-sized issuers.” See Listing Process for 
Listing on GEM, HKEX, https://www.hkex.com.hk/Join-Our-Market/IPO/Getting-Started/Listing-on-
GEM?sc_lang=en [https://perma.cc/H7J7-Z4AF] (last visited Dec. 29, 2020). 
 153.  Wind database is a financial information services provider in China, specializing in financial 
information of Chinese companies and the Chinese market. About Us, WIND, 
https://www.wind.com.cn/en/about.html [https://perma.cc/N8UV-C3LS] (last visited September 19, 
2020). 
 154.  It should be noted that a private enterprise might still have state owners, except the state would 
not be a controlling shareholder. 
 155.  The list of companies is extracted from the website of Hong Kong Exchange. China Dimension, 
supra note 138. Based on the list of companies, the study calculates the number of H-share and red-chip 
companies on both the Main Board and GEM. 
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Table 1. Number of Chinese Businesses Listed in Hong Kong by Listing Boards 
and Types 
 H-share Red-chip Total 
Main Board 236 158 394 
Growth Enterprise market 24 5 29 
Total 260 163 423 
 
Among the 260 H-share companies, 59.26% (154 of 260) were 
identified as SOEs, and nearly 90% (142 of 159) of the red-chip companies 
were SOEs based on the designation by the Wind database. Thus, Chinese 
SOEs have not only chosen to list in Hong Kong via the H-share channel but 
also used foreign-incorporated entities as their listing entity in Hong Kong. 
In summary, 423 Chinese businesses are listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (HKEx). Most (70.69%) of the companies are SOEs. Some are 
incorporated in China, classified as H-share companies, and others are 
incorporated outside China, classified as red-chip companies. The next 
section explores the extent to which those 423 companies adopted Party 
building provisions. 
2. Incorporating Party Building Provisions 
This section evaluates compliance with the CCP’s mandate, as 
measured by the rate of Party-building provisions incorporated into 
corporate constitutions. Given that Chinese law requires government 
approval to list a domestic entity in Hong Kong,156 SOEs are more likely to 
be allowed to list overseas than non-SOEs.157  This Article expected that 
SOEs (whether listed as H-share or red-chips) would adopt Party building 
given the state ownership and the CCP’s control over the government under 
China’s one-party political system. Despite the omnipresence of the CCP in 
China, private enterprises are less likely to comply because they are not 
directly controlled by the state or the CCP. 
 
 156.  See Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Guanyu Guifan Jingnei Shangshi Gongsi 
Suoshu Qiye Dao Jingwai Shangshi Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi (中国证券监督管理委员会关于规范
境内上市公司所属企业到境外上市有关问题的通知) [Circular of the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission on Several Issues Concerning the Standardization on Overseas Listing of Subordinated 
Enterprises of Domestically-Listed Companies] (promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm’n, July 21, 
2004, effective July 21, 2004), http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=10081&CGid=# 
[https://perma.cc/UN3Q-ZDM6]. 
 157.  Mingyi Hung et al., Political Considerations in the Decision of Chinese SOEs to List in Hong 
Kong, 53 J. ACCT. & ECON. 435, 435 (2012). 
CC. FOREIGN INTERFERENCE MACROS VER. 2 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2021  10:16 PM 
334 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 31:301 
Surprisingly, the data revealed a different picture. The study tracked 
corporate constitutions158 to measure compliance with the CCP mandate.  
The study also examined the kind of compliance adopted by looking at three 
kinds of provisions—organizational, management, and human resources 
interference—into their constitutions.159 Compliance was measured by the 
rate of adoption of any party-building provision among all companies. 
Despite encouragement from the CCP since 2016, only 33.1% of companies 
(140 of 423) adopted any kind of Party building provision by the end of 2018. 
Furthermore, 53.46% (139 of the 260) H-share companies (those 
incorporated in Mainland China) complied with the mandate, whereas only 
a single (0.61%) red-chip company (incorporated outside China) complied. 
In short, companies incorporated in China were more likely to adopt Party 
building provisions than foreign-incorporated Chinese businesses.160 
This study also examined the compliance rate between SOEs and 
private enterprises. As most Chinese businesses in Hong Kong were Chinese 
SOEs, regardless of where the listed entity was incorporated, it was no 
surprise that SOEs were more likely to adopt Party building provisions than 
private enterprises. Of the 299 SOEs, 121 (40.47%) adopted Party building 
provisions. In contrast, only 19 of 124 private enterprises (15.32%) adopted 
such provisions.161  However, SOEs incorporated in China were much more 
likely to incorporate Party building into their constitutions than SOEs 
incorporated offshore (i.e., the red-chips). If SOEs are supposed to be more 
likely to follow the CCP’s mandate, the interesting question is why SOEs 
incorporated outside the mainland were much less likely to do so. Part IV 
further explores the result by examining the kinds of provisions that were 
adopted. 
3. The Types of Party Building Provisions Adopted 
Equipped with the overall compliance rate among different Chinese 
businesses, this Section shifts to analyzing the kinds of provisions adopted. 
Although SASAC issued template provisions, the provisions that were 
adopted varied, as demonstrated in Table 2. The Table demonstrates the 
 
 158.  HKEX NEWS, http://www3.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/advancedsearch/search_active 
_main.aspx [https://perma.cc/3LED-FF4Y] (last visited Jan. 16, 2021). This website is the disclosure 
platform by the Hong Kong Exchange. To determine whether a company adopted party building 
provisions we searched for the company by its stock code and located different versions of a company’s 
constitutional documents since 2015 to examine whether there has been any change made for Party 
Building using some keywords (e.g. “Communist”). 
 159.  See supra Part III.A. 
 160.  The difference is statistically significant (chi2 = 22.3, p < 0.001; Fisher’s exact < 0.001). 
 161.  The difference between SOEs and private enterprises is statistically significant (chi2 = 25.03, 
p < 0.001). 
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adoption rate of party-building provisions: organizational interference, 
management interference, and human resources interference. The following 
paragraphs pertains only to companies that incorporated any kind of 
provision. When measured against the total number of companies, the 
overall adoption rate for each kind of provision is less than one-third. 
 
Table 2. The Adoption of Different Provisions 
Provisions Number of 
companies 
% of companies 
adopting Party 
building 
(n = 140) 
% of total Chinese 
businesses listed in Hong 
Kong, including non-
adopting companies 
(n = 423) 
Organizational interference 
Having Party organization 137 97.86% 32.39% 
Integrating CCP constitution 139 99.29% 32.86% 
Supporting Party organization’s 
resources 
119 85.00% 28.13% 
With disciplinary committee 94 67.14% 22.22% 
Full-time deputy Party secretary 65 46.43% 15.37% 
Management interference 
Consulting Party organization 
before major decisions 
120 85.71% 28.37% 
Human resources interference 
Chairman and Party secretary are 
the same person 
54 38.57% 12.77% 
Supervising CCP’s cadre 109 77.86% 25.77% 
 
Of the companies that complied with the mandate, companies most 
commonly accepted provisions related to organizational interference, 
regardless of whether they were SOEs or private enterprises. More 
specifically, nearly all companies adopted the presence of the Party 
organization within the company (97.86%) and integrated the CCP’s 
constitution (99.29%).162 However, other organizational interference 
provisions were not uniformly adopted. Although over a majority of 
companies agreed to provide the Party organization with resources (85%), 
only two-thirds agreed to form a disciplinary committee (67.14%).  
Employing a full-time deputy Party secretary was even less popular 
(46.43%). Thus, it appears that most of the companies incorporated the 
presence of a Party organization, which might have already been in place, or 
 
 162.  See supra Part III.A. 
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integrating the CCP’s constitution. However, they did not favor the 
monitoring that would result from a disciplinary committee or full-time 
deputy secretary. 
In addition to adopting organizational interference, most companies 
also complied with management interference. Over 85% of companies 
agreed to consult with the Party before making major decisions. The 
adoption rate is similar with supporting party organization’s resources. Thus, 
most adopting companies seemed to be acceptable to organizational and 
management interference. 
Despite compliance with the other two provisions, companies were less 
likely to accept human resources interference. Although over three-quarters 
of companies adopted the CCP’s supervision over cadres, fewer than 40% of 
the companies incorporated that the chairman of the board of directors and 
the Party secretary would be the same person. In addition, only about 2/3 of 
adopting firms accept the disciplinary committee. Obviously firms adopting 
Party building are less keen on those two provisions. 
 
Table 3. The Adoption of Different Provisions by SOEs and Private Enterprises 















% of total 
private 
enterprises 
(n = 124) 







119 39.8% 98.35% 18 14.52% 94.74% 
Integrating CCP 
constitution 








81 27.09% 66.94% 13 10.48% 68.42% 
Full-time deputy 
Party secretary 






104 34.78% 85.95% 16 12.3% 84.21% 
Human resources interference 
Chairman and 
Party secretary 
are the same 
person 
44 14.72% 36.36% 10 8.06% 52.63% 
Supervising 
CCP’s cadre 
96 32.11% 79.34% 13 10.48% 68.42% 
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Table 3 examines the kinds of “Party building” provisions adopted by 
SOEs and private enterprises. Two interesting questions arise from Table 3. 
Why did some SOEs fail to formalize Party building in their companies two 
years after President Xi Jinping’s policy statement in October 2016?163 
Second, why did private enterprises comply despite lacking any substantial 
state ownership? 
Politically connected private enterprises listed in Mainland China are 
more likely to adopt party-building provisions than other non-connected 
companies.164 However, adoption tends to be symbolic.165 Our data supports 
that finding. Among the companies incorporating Party building, there was 
little difference between SOEs and private enterprises when it came to 
having a Party organization, integrating the CCP’s constitution, and 
supporting the Party organization. Adopting organizational interference 
provisions demonstrates minimum degrees of loyalty to the Party by 
accepting the CCP’s presence in the company. 
The difference between SOEs and private enterprises pertained to 
provisions regarding human resources interference. Among the private 
enterprises, there were more instances in which a single individual was both 
the chairman and the Party secretary, although there was less acceptance of 
CCP supervision over the Party cadre. However, there was no clear proof 
indicating that SOEs were more likely to accept the dual role of chairman 
and Party secretary166 or the provision allowing CCP supervision of 
personnel and CCP cadres.167 
In addition, among SOEs, those controlled by the central government 
(central SOEs) were more likely than other SOEs (local SOEs) to accept 
management and human resources interference. Central SOEs were more 
likely to adopt the provision for management interference, with 58 out of 63 
(92.06%) incorporating it as opposed to 46 out of 58 (79.31%) local SOEs.168 
Central SOEs were more likely to adopt the dual position of chairman and 
Party secretary169  and allow the Party organization to supervise their 
personnel and the CCP cadre.170 
To some extent, the data presented in this Article is compatible with 
other studies focusing on SOEs listed on Chinese stock exchanges. A study 
 
 163.  See New Requirements Raised by General Secretary Xi Jinping, supra note 23. 
 164.  Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 37, at 19–22. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  The difference is not statistically significant (chi2 = 1.834, p = 0.176). 
 167.  The difference is not statistically significant (chi2 = 1.135, p = 0.287). 
 168.  The difference is statistically significant (chi2 = 4.067, p = 0.044). 
 169.  The difference is statistically significant (chi2 = 5.309, p = 0.021). 
 170.  The difference is statistically significant (chi2 = 5.083, p = 0.024). 
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found that SOEs were more likely to adopt Party-building provisions than 
those on foreign exchanges. The study also found that 676 out of 808 
(83.67%) SOEs listed in China adopted “management interference” 
provisions.171 Seven hundred thirty-two companies (90.59%) had agreed to 
the dual-role of chairman and Party secretary, and 713 companies (88.24%) 
had allowed the CCP to become involved in personnel decisions.172 In 
addition, a more recent study showed that 57.88% of the adopting SOEs 
listed in China accepted management interference, 34.30% accepted the 
dual-role of chairman and Party secretary, and 65.93% agreed to the Party’s 
control over the cadre.173 Based on 299 SOEs listed in Hong Kong 
(regardless of whether they were cross-listed in China), our data showed that 
34.78% of these SOEs adopted management interference, 14.72% accepted 
the dual-role and 32.11% agreed to the Party’s control over the cadre. 
Comparing with other studies focusing on listed SOEs in China, this Article 
shows that Chinese SOEs were less inclined to adopt Party building 
provisions if they were listed outside of China. This aligns with prior 
observations that foreign-incorporated companies, or red chips, were less 
likely to adopt Party building. 
A further question was whether the amount of state ownership stakes 
affects the decision to adopt Party building provisions. Previous research 
suggested that an SOE is more likely to adopt Party building if the state owns 
a higher proportion of the company.174 This study relied on the largest 
shareholder’s direct shareholding as a benchmark to measure state ownership 
because existing databases do not present full beneficial ownership data.175 
Using logistic regression, the study examined whether the number of shares 
held by the largest shareholder impacted Party building provisions’ adoption. 
At first, the regression did not yield any significant result because the 
percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder did not correlate with 
the decision as to whether to adopt Party building (p = 0.187). However, 
adding a dummy variable to the equation regarding the company’s H-share 
status showed that both the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholder (p < 0.001) and the company’s status as an H-share company (p 
< 0.001) had a positive effect on the likelihood of adopting “Party building.” 
 
 171.  Liu & Zhang, supra note 37, at 8 tbl.3. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 37, at 19–20 tbl.4. 
 174.  Liu & Zhang, supra note 37; Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 37, at 20–21 tbl.5. 
 175.  For example, the CSMAR database provides the names of the largest shareholders or the 
beneficial interest holders. However, it is not clear from the database or the names whether the holders 
are related to the state. 
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The H-share dummy had a much more pronounced effect (odds ratio = 
230.44) than the largest shareholder (coefficient = 1.03). 
There were similar effects when adopting the same model to analyze 
the odds of adopting provisions related to organizational interference or 
human resources interference. Nevertheless, no statistically significant result 
emerged when the study analyzed the management interference provision. 
This indicated that the largest shareholder’s degree of direct control would 
matter if a company was incorporated in China (i.e., an H-share company). 
It was also consistent with previous studies of Party building reforms for 
SOEs listed in China.176 However, this was less of a problem for red-chip 
companies. The result might reflect the general disinclination of red-chip 
companies to adopt any Party building provisions. 
Furthermore, highly regulated industries were more likely to adopt 
Party building provisions than less regulated industries.177 Utilizing WIND’s 
industry classification,178 this study identified five highly-regulated 
industries: finance, public utilities, mining, energy, and real estate, based on 
earlier research on political influence and the post-IPO performance of 
Chinese companies.179 Out of the 423 companies studied, 192 (45.39%) were 
in one of the highly regulated industries. These included 78 financial 
institutions, 29 public utility companies, 32 real estate companies, 17 energy 
companies, and 36 mining companies. Of those 192 highly-regulated 
companies, 76 companies (39.58%) included Party building in their 
constitutions, whereas only 27.71% of less-regulated companies complied. 
Thus, there was a correlation between the degree of regulation and 
acceptance of Party building provisions. 
Companies in highly regulated industries, like finance, are expected to 
be more likely to adopt Party building because increased interactions with 
regulators invite political interference.180 For example, public utilities such 
as water, electricity, and petroleum often attract strong public interest and, 
consequently, government intervention, exposing them to political influence. 
Thus, those companies are expected to experience more political pressure to 
 
 176.  Liu & Zhang, supra note 37; Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 37, at 22–23. 
 177.  The difference is statistically significant (chi2 = 6.680, p = 0.010). 
 178.  See WIND, WIND HANGYE FENLEI BIAOZHUN (WIND行业分类标准) [THE INDUSTRY 
CLASSIFICATION STANDARDS OF WIND DATABASE] (2005), http://net.wind.com.cn/WindNET/Bulletin/ 
express/WICS_Full_200501.pdf [https://perma.cc/REZ6-X6HQ]. 
 179.  Joseph P.H. Fan et al., Politically Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and Post-IPO 
Performance of China’s Newly Partially Privatized Firms, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 330, 340 (2007). 
 180.  See Politicians and Firms, supra note 34, at 1015 (noting that it is easier for politicians to use 
their control over regulated firms to pursue political objectives when there is heavy regulation of firms, 
due to lowered costs); supra Part II.A.1 (discussing different types of political interference in corporate 
governance). 
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adopt Party building. Given the extensive regulations, it is reasonable to 
assume that such entities could be more susceptible to political pressure 
exercised by regulatory bodies. 
In particular, financial firms were more likely to adopt Party building 
provisions than companies in any other industry.181 It could be because firms 
in financial services are subject to intensive regulations by financial 
regulators, whether they are banks, insurance companies, or securities 
brokers. However, the data cannot explain whether companies in other 
highly regulated industries (e.g., mining or public utilities) are more or less 
likely to adopt Party building. Therefore, one should be careful not to 
overstate the role of industry in adopting Party building. 
C. Hong Kong’s Reaction to Party Building 
This study next considers the market’s reaction to the Party building 
reform. Utilizing the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), 182 the study 
observed two events: (1) President Xi Jinping’s public announcement on 
October 12, 2016;183 and (2) the official publication of the “Party building” 
template provisions on January 3, 2017.184 The former event was when 
President Xi made an important policy declaration, and the latter was when 
it became clear what Party building might mean in practice. We expect the 
market to respond to these two significant events which signal the CCP’s 
political interference with listed companies’ governance. If the market 
reacted negatively as measured by the CAR, it would indicate that the market 
disfavored the Party building reform, and the event could hurt shareholder 
value. The opposite would be true if the CAR were positive. 
The study used shares trading data of the 423 companies listed in Hong 
Kong on the days surrounding the two events. The event windows were 11 
days, 5 days, and 3 days before and after the event day (i.e. [-5, 5], [-2, 2], [-
1, 1]) and a window of 1 day after the event day ([0, 1]). The analysis 
measured these companies’ stock returns against the stock returns of the 
 
 181.  The difference is statistically significant (chi2 = 12.340, p < 0.001). 
 182.  In general, a cumulative abnormal return is the sum of each daily abnormal return within an 
event window. An abnormal return is the actual stock market return minus the expected return based on 
a market model. See Abnormal Return, CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/ 
knowledge/trading-investing/abnormal-return/ [https://perma.cc/K4RH-WMH4] (last visited Mar. 25, 
2021). 
 183.  See New Requirements Raised by General Secretary Xi Jinping, supra note 23. 
 184.  See, e.g., Requirements of Incorporation of Party Building Work, supra note 114. 
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Hang Seng Index, the leading stock market index in Hong Kong,185 for the 
previous 20 to 170 days before the event day.186 Table 4 shows the results: 
 
Table 4. Summary of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (%) 
Variable Mean t Value Pr > |t| Variable Mean t Value Pr > |t| 
Event date: October 12, 2016 
N = 373 
Event Date: January 3, 2017 
N = 377 
[0, 1] 0.1861 1.13 0.2593 [0, 1] -0.752 -4.09*** <.0001 
[-1, 1] 0.5625 2.69*** 0.0074 [-1, 1] -0.11 -0.62 0.536 
[-2, 2] 0.8763 3.34*** 0.0009 [-2, 2] -0.391 -1.71* 0.089 
[-5, 5] 2.0708 5.46*** <.0001 [-5, 5] -1.519 -4.4*** <.0001 
“*”, “**” and “***” represent “p < 0.1,” “p < 0.05,” and “p < 0.01,” respectively 
 
The data presented in Table 4 show a contrasting pattern. On October 
12, 2016, when President Xi Jinping made the policy declaration, investors 
in Hong Kong reacted positively during the 3-day, 5-day, and 10-day event 
windows. However, when model provisions were published on January 3, 
2017, the market responded negatively. On both occasions, the CAR value 
for the data was statistically significant. 
The consistently positive response to the October 2016 announcement 
could be a result of optimistic market sentiment after a long holiday break in 
China. According to the literature,  it is unclear whether long holidays could 
cause the stock market to rise or fall before or after the break.187 President 
Xi made the announcement during a Party conference, immediately after 
China’s long National Day holiday starting  on October 1.188 However, this 
 
 185.  The current and historical constituents of the Hang Seng Index are available on the website of 
Hang Seng Indexes Company Ltd. See Hang Seng Index and Sub-Indexes, HANG SENG INDEXES, 
https://www.hsi.com.hk/eng/indexes/all-indexes/hsi [https://perma.cc/7X6D-R5VE] (last visited Sept. 
21, 2020). 
 186.  The data source utilized for this analysis was Datastream, an online database on the global stock 
markets located on the Refinitiv website. See Datastream, REFINITIV, https://www.refinitiv.com/en/ 
products/datastream-macroeconomic-analysis [https://perma.cc/76W5-KQU8] (last visited September 
21, 2020). 
 187.  See, e.g., Tian Yuan et al., The Pre-Holiday Effect in China: Abnormal Returns or 
Compensation for Risk?, 18 REV. PAC. BASIN FIN. MKT. & POLICIES 1550014-1 (2015); Tian Yuan & 
Rakesh Gupta, Chinese Lunar New Year Effect in Asian Stock Markets, 1999-2012, 54 Q. REV. ECON. & 
FIN. 529 (2014). In contrast, an Australian study found a potential pre-holiday effect on the stock market, 
but no post-holiday effect. See George J. Marrett & Andrew C. Worthington, An Empirical Note on the 
Holiday Effect in the Australian Stock Market, 1996-2006, 16 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 1769 (2009). 
 188.  In 2016, the National Day holiday started from October 1 and ran until October 7, 2016, 
followed by the weekend on October 8 and 9, 2016. Alexandra Suarez, China’s Golden Week 2016: 
Country Spends $180 Billion During National Holiday, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2016, 1:49 PM), 
CC. FOREIGN INTERFERENCE MACROS VER. 2 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2021  10:16 PM 
342 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 31:301 
Article does not measure the possible effect of the stock market movement 
following the long holiday, though the possibility that CARs were affected 
by holidays cannot be excluded. 
Furthermore, the market may have responded positively in 2016 
because the market did not fully appreciate the vague wordings in President 
Xi’s speech, such as incorporating the Party’s leadership into all corners of 
corporate governance or embedding Party organization into corporate 
governance structure.189 In contrast, by January 2017, investors knew more 
precisely how the CCP would implement Party building in the corporate 
governance of listed companies based on the template provisions. Thus, once 
the substance of Party building was better understood, the market reacted 
negatively, indicating that the market saw the CCP’s political interference 
through Party building to be hurting the companies (and henceforth the 
negative CAR in January 2017). 
Observing the January 2017 event, the CARs of red-chip companies 
was lower than that of H-share companies. The difference in the means was 
statistically significant when a two-sample t-test was used.190 This indicated 
that investors responded more negatively to the news when it affected red-
chip companies, Chinese businesses incorporated outside China. For the 
three-day event window, the mean of CAR for H-share companies was 
0.12%, as opposed to 0.55% for red-chips. For the five-day event window, 
the mean of CAR for H-share companies was 0.02%, in contrast to 0.98% 
for red-chips. Although most red-chips are Chinese SOEs, this suggests that 
the Party building movement enhanced the risk that foreign-incorporated 
businesses would be subject to a higher degree of political interference than 
outside investors were willing to accept. If so, the data reflects the negative 
effects of external political interference.191 Other variables, such as whether 
a firm was an SOE or cross-listed in China’s A-share market, lacked 
statistical significance. 
D. Summary of Findings 
This Part presents several findings regarding how Chinese businesses 
listed in Hong Kong responded to the Party building movement. First, only 




 189.  See New Requirements Raised by General Secretary Xi Jinping, supra note 23. 
 190.  For example, p = 0.037 for a 3-day event window and p = 0.031 for a 5-day event window. 
 191.  See supra Part II.A. 
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President Xi’s policy declaration.192 Second, companies incorporated in 
China, or H-share companies, incorporated were more likely to adopt “Party 
building” than companies incorporated outside China or red-chip companies. 
This suggests that foreign-incorporated companies were more resistant to the 
influence of the CCP. Third, among the companies that incorporated “Party 
building” provisions, most accepted organizational interference, such as 
having a Party organization. Additionally, over 75% accepted management 
interference through Party supervision of cadres. However, companies were 
less likely to incorporate a full-time deputy Party secretary or a disciplinary 
committee. Companies were also reluctant to have the same person serve as 
both the chairman and Party secretary. Fourth, for companies incorporated 
in China, the more shares held by the majority shareholder, the more likely 
the company adopted Party building. However, this effect was not as 
pronounced for companies incorporated outside China. From these 
observations, Part IV reflects on how regulators respond to foreign political 
interference. 
IV. REFLECTIONS ON DETERRING POLITICAL INTERFERENCE 
BY FOREIGN ACTORS 
A. Explaining the Reactions by Corporate Stakeholders 
Any regulatory action to counter foreign political interference should 
be based on reactions by corporate stakeholders. Part II of predicted that 
stakeholders generally object to external political interference.193 Managers 
do not welcome interference that undermines their discretion. Similarly, non-
state investors disfavor political interference because the state’s agenda may 
divert resources away from value-maximizing allocations. Therefore, 
companies are generally expected to resist foreign political interference. 
The evidence presented in Part III supported this hypothesis. 
Approximately one-third of companies adopted some forms of Party 
building provisions. Perhaps more will succumb to continuing political 
pressure unless there is a radical change in the CCP’s policy. However, many 
companies did not swiftly comply with the CCP’s mandate, even among 
SOEs. The lukewarm responses of the SOEs were surprising. SOEs were 
expected to quickly adopt Party building, given their state ownership and the 
pre-existing relationship between the management and the CCP. 
This Article argues that companies did not adopt “Party building” 
provisions because of management’s rejection or delay, despite the external 
 
 192.  As mentioned previously, President Xi Jinping made the policy declaration on October 12, 
2016. See New Requirements Raised by General Secretary Xi Jinping, supra note 23. 
 193.  See supra Part II.B. 
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governmental mandate.194 On the one hand, it is probably not due to a strong 
and negative market reaction to Party building to prevent SOEs from 
adopting Party building. As Part III revealed, the Hong Kong market did not 
have a particularly strong negative reaction (reflected in the CARs) to the 
policy declaration in October 2016. Furthermore, the market exhibited a 
marginally negative reaction to the publication of template Party building 
provisions a few months later. Thus, although the market responded 
negatively to the sample provisions’ publication, it did not elicit a forcible 
reaction. The stock market, thus, likely did not act as a restraint to 
compliance with the CCP. 
On the other hand, reluctance to adopt Party building was also probably 
not due to a potential takeover by another company. Especially for Chinese 
SOEs, the market for corporate control was, arguably, non-existent due to 
tight state-ownership. Our data cannot fully measure the true level of state 
ownership in Chinses SOEs, as the true extent of state ownership is not fully 
disclosed to the public. According to the OECD, the Chinese state owned 
more than 70% of SOEs’ voting power on average.195 Given these high state 
ownership stakes, the chance that a non-state player could acquire control 
over a Chinese SOE outside of China was extremely low. Hence, it is highly 
unlikely that concern over potential takeovers restrained the decision to 
adopt Party building. 
Thus, the decision to not comply with Party building, notably for SOEs 
incorporated outside of China, likely came from management. In another 
study focusing on companies listed in China, some companies only 
underwent amendments of their constitutions at the behest of SASAC, 
demonstrating resistance by SOE managers.196 In fact, there have been at 
least two reported cases where shareholders have rejected Party building.197 
Undoubtedly, non-state shareholders played a role in the final decision if we 
assume that state owners should vote in favor of Party building. In one case, 
39% of the holders of H-shares in the ICBC voted against Party building.198 
In another case, the Tianjin Real Estate Group shareholders voted down the 
Party building amendment in 2017, despite state control over 26% of its 
 
 194.  Studies on Mainland-listed companies show that managerial resistance mainly comes from 
central SOEs that underperformed and are less competitive internationally. See Lin, supra note 80, at 29–
32. 
 195.  OECD, Chapter 4: The Theory of the Market for Corporate Control and the Current State of 
the Market for Corporate Control in China, at 34, https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernance 
ofstate-ownedenterprises/31601011.pdf [https://perma.cc/59EL-3E3L] (last visited Jan. 16, 2020). 
 196.  See Lin, supra note 80, at 26–29. 
 197.  See Zhang, supra note 21, at 59. 
 198.  Id. 
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shares.199 It has also been reported that 20.52% of minority shareholders and 
52.34% of the H-share companies’ foreign shareholders voted against Party 
building amendment proposals.200 Therefore, it is less likely due to 
shareholders’ revolt that companies resist Party building. 
One explanation of managers’ resistance is that companies listed 
outside China are more exposed to the stakeholders outside China, which the 
CCP cannot control. These companies may face more pressure from 
non-Chinese shareholders, especially institutional shareholders. Any 
significant impact on share prices may also increase the cost of financing. If 
so, the managers of such companies would naturally prefer to delay Party 
building. 
The complex VIE structure201 may also assist the management’s 
resistance to Party building. The VIE structure could empower managers to 
resist political interference to some extent. Formal restraint in a VIE 
structured company is relatively weaker, employed through a series of 
contracts and corporate chains, instead of through direct shareholders’ rights, 
typical of companies incorporated in China, through which the CCP can 
directly control state owners. Thus, the VIE structure implies that the parent 
company in China has less control over a listed entity incorporated offshore. 
It explains the low adoption rate by red-chip companies, which are 
incorporated outside China. 
In addition, data presented in this Article is also consistent with the 
bonding theory, which suggests that cross-listing in multiple stock markets 
creates a “bonding mechanism.”202 In such cases, companies must comply 
with “higher regulatory or disclosure standards and thus to implement a form 
of ‘bonding’ under which firms commit to governance standards more 
exacting than those of their home countries.”203 The bonding theory could 
partially explain why the H-share companies were more likely to adopt 
“Party building” than the red-chip companies. Many H-share companies are 
cross-listed in either Shanghai or Shenzhen. For cross-listed companies, the 
actual number of shares available for trading in Hong Kong (i.e., H-shares) 
represents a relatively small percentage of the total number of shares.204 
 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Lin, supra note 80, at 21. 
 201.  See supra Part III.B.1 (describing the VIE structure). 
 202.  John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate 
Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U.L. REV. 641, 674 (1999). 
 203.  Id. at 652. 
 204.  According to one report, the average total market capitalization of the A-share market of those 
dual-listed companies in both China and Hong Kong was two or three times larger than that of the H-
share market, despite H-shares having a higher level of free float than A-shares. FTSE RUSSELL, 
CAPTURING THE CHINESE A-SHARES AND H-SHARES ANOMALY 4 (2017). 
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Investors in China may be less sensitive to external political interference than 
investors in Hong Kong. Being incorporated in China also means that H-
share companies face more direct political pressure than red-chip companies, 
as they still have their head offices in the Mainland. 
That being said, companies are nonetheless amenable to some forms of 
organizational interference and management interference by the CCP. After 
all, many companies probably already had Party organization inside the 
company before the Party building campaign.205 For those companies, 
formalizing a Party organization’s presence and its role in the company may 
not be more than recognizing the company’s existing state. In addition, 
although consulting Party committees for major decisions reduces 
managerial discretion, it might not be wise to show hostility to Party 
members because it could be, for one, detrimental to a manager’s career. For 
example, a manager defying the CCP’s instruction may not receive 
promotions in the company or other places, especially when the manager has 
some political ambition. Being cordial to the Party committee and 
formalizing some of its de facto functions could be an acceptable 
compromise. This amenability might explain why the rate of agreeing to 
consult the Party before a management decision has been similar to adopting 
Party organizations. 
In contrast, the companies demonstrated hostility, measured by low 
adoption rate, to human resources interference and extra Party monitoring 
such as a disciplinary inspection committee or full-time Party secretary. For 
one, management should prefer to retain control over the company’s human 
resources decisions, which are necessary for effective management. The 
extra oversight exercised by the Party secretary or disciplinary inspection 
committee may mean that a manager has to make a decision in accordance 
with the interests of the CCP rather than the interests of the company if the 
CCP’s interests are not aligned with the company’s.206 This explains why 
these companies were less in favor of provisions that, for example, allowed 
the CCP to manage Party cadre and the promotion of some managers. Hence, 
the companies were less likely to incorporate intrusive “Party building” 
provisions. In other words, management preferred to conduct operations 
without outsiders dictating how things should be done. In turn, this indicates 
that company managers were deliberately selective when complying with 
Party building provisions. Perhaps there is a kind of trade-off. Instead of 
facing sustained political pressure to adopt Party building provisions, it 
 
 205.  See Zhang, supra note 21, at 60 (noting that by the end of 2016, 67.8% of domest private 
enterprises and 70% of foreign investment enterprises had established party organizations). 
 206.  See discussion supra Part III.A (explaining how the extra oversight and threat of diciplinary 
actions can cause a manager to prioritize the interests of the CCP, instead of the company’s interests). 
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might be better to comply with less intrusive measures without relenting to 
more direct control. 
B. Regulatory Concerns and Responses 
One might surmise that the low adoption rate means that regulators need 
not be concerned. This Article cannot predict how the domestic political 
climate in China and geopolitical events in the region, like the U.S.-China 
trade war, will develop. If political pressure is sustained, there is a fair chance 
that most SOEs, or even private enterprises, will succumb to Party building. 
If we look beyond this case study, foreign political interference remains an 
issue as long as foreign governments want to influence a listed company. 
Investors in the stock market can still suffer losses if a foreign government 
decides to sacrifice the company’s long-term interests and its shareholders 
in favor of the government’s interest. The Party building movement offers a 
rare chance to observe how company managers and shareholders respond to 
external political interference from another country. Hence, the outcome of 
this Article will provide valuable lessons for the future. 
Based on the foregoing, this Article suggests that improving 
transparency is a more efficient approach to empower corporate stakeholders 
to deal with foreign political interference in corporate governance. As 
demonstrated, management is generally not enthusiastic about adopting 
Party building. Thus, managers provide the first layer of a company’s 
defense. They might choose to ignore the political interference before 
presenting it to shareholders. In addition, existing and prospective 
shareholders can apply pressure to the management by selling shares of the 
company in the market (thereby lowering share prices) if they consider 
political interference harmful to the company. Together, the responses by 
managers, shareholders, and investors could generate market power to curb 
the acceptance of external political interference. The low adoption rate of 
Party building by Chinese businesses in Hong Kong supports this argument. 
It is important to improve transparency and to provide information regarding 
external political interference to the stock market to ensure that corporate 
stakeholders can make sound decisions. The approach thereby allows 
managers and shareholders to decide what is best for their companies. The 
Article refers to this as the market-driven approach. 
However, the ability of a market-driven approach depends on market 
conditions. The market requires shareholders to generate sufficient pressure 
on management to resist Party building or external political interference. 
Hong Kong’s stock market is international, with a variety of individual, 
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institutional, and international investors.207 Hence, the market can provide 
the power to restrain management’s conduct concerning foreign political 
interference. Shareholders’ reactions might differ in the Chinese stock 
markets. This Article did not cover Chinese businesses listed in other 
markets (e.g., New York, London, or Singapore) and cautions against 
drawing too many conclusions from the data. 
In addition, our data also suggests an alternative approach, that 
securities regulators could require companies to list with a foreign-
incorporated entity outside their home market to combat external political 
interference. As indicated above, red-chip companies are far less likely to 
adopt Party building than their H-share counterparts, even though many red-
chip companies are also SOEs.208 Thus, a foreign-incorporated entity may be 
more immune to political interference from the CCP. If this is the case, one 
normative suggestion is that regulators could request a company coming 
from a market known to have strong political interference in corporate 
governance to have the listing entity incorporated outside its home market 
(e.g., a red-chip company). In short, a regulator could use foreign 
incorporated companies to insulate the market from political pressure. 
Nevertheless, there are some problems with this approach. It is unclear 
whether there is a causal effect between the place of registration and the 
decision to adopt Party building. It is also unclear how and to what extent 
the VIE structure might remove a parent company from China’s control and 
how the structure might result in more insulation from political interference. 
However, forcing a listed entity to register outside its home market, if 
possible, could be a politically unpopular move—especially when the home 
market is a powerhouse like China. This listing requirement also does not 
resolve the underlying challenges of governing, monitoring, and enforcing 
rules against a foreign-incorporated entity when most of its assets and major 
businesses are in another market. Thus, any potential gain from being 
insulated from political interference could be outweighed by additional 
monitoring costs. This, however, is a subject for another study. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article proposes a market-driven approach, rooted in transparency, 
to resist foreign political interference in listed companies’ governance. 
Although external political interference generally harms companies, 
 
 207.  Per the Hong Kong Exchange’s survey published in 2017, institutional investors remain the 
largest participant group in the market, and overseas investors are the largest investor group by origin (as 
opposed to local investors). See News Release, HKEx, Survey Finds Hong Kong Securities Market 
Attracts Wide Range of Investors (July 13, 2017) (on file with HKEx). 
 208.  See supra Part III.B.3. 
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stakeholders react differently depending on their interests. Securities 
regulators’ response should, in turn, depend on the reactions of management, 
minority shareholders, and prospective investors. This Article utilized the 
Party building movement in China to examine how companies react to 
political interference. Based on the template provisions that the Chinese 
government expected companies to adopt into corporate constitutions, this 
Article categorizes Party building provisions into three major forms: 
organizational interference (relating to the formalization of CCP 
organization in a company), management interference (relating the CCP’s 
role in management’s decisions), and human resources interference (relating 
to personnel promotion and the dual role of chairman and Party secretary). 
This Article focused on Chinese businesses listed in Hong Kong, an 
international financial center and popular listing venue of Chinese firms. 
Overall, less than a third of those companies adopted Party building 
provisions by the end of 2018.209 Low adoption rates suggest that managers 
resisted political interference, especially when a company was incorporated 
outside Mainland China. The result shows that corporate stakeholders, 
including managers, shareholders, and prospective investors, were largely 
against Party building by the CCP, even in an international and open market 
like Hong Kong. This is surprising given the close relationship between 
Mainland China and Hong Kong and because many Chinese businesses in 
Hong Kong are SOEs. 
Moreover, among the companies that adopted Party building 
provisions, they were willing to accept some degree of organizational or 
managerial interference. However, they did not adopt provisions that gave 
the Party direct control over personnel or human resources decisions. Thus, 
even if companies adopted Party building, managers and shareholders were 
resigned to the fact that Party organizations might have already existed inside 
the company, and that it was good to maintain some cordial relationship with 
the CCP. Nevertheless, corporate stakeholders were not keen to accept more 
direct intrusion into management, such as promoting personnel or even 
controlling the board of directors through the Party secretary. In conclusion, 
the market and corporate stakeholders have some effective responses to the 
CCP’s Party building campaign by either not adopting or adopting less 
harmful forms of interference. Securities regulators should adopt a market-
driven approach, through transparency requirements that empower managers 
and shareholders to correct for external political interference, instead of 
direct interventions like mandatory delisting. 
 
 
 209.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
